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Editor’s Note
by Jacob Huber
Welcome to the December edition of the EDI Quarterly! This issue 
features contributions on unconventional gas and green gas. 
Two perspectives from the US are presented, discussing issues 
surrounding the exploitation of unconventional gas there in addition to 
an explanation of the technical issues surrounding shale gas and an 
overview of European developments. The section on biogas discusses 
recent developments, a decision support tool for investments, 
certification of green gas, and a perspective on injection into the Dutch 
natural gas grid. Finally, a new section is devoted to brief summaries of 
interesting conferences members of the Intelligence Unit at EDI have 
recently attended. 
The themes of the next Quarterly will be gas quality and smart grids. 
Should any of our readers be interested in making a contribution in 
either of these areas please contact us at the address that you can find 
below. We hope that you enjoy all of the interesting contributions in 
this issue. 
quarterly@energydelta.nl
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2Shale gas in Europe: replication 
of American success or a concealed 
illusion?
By Nadja Kogdenko
Energy Analyst, Energy Delta Institute
The shale gas revolution in the US is frequently cited 
as one of the major highlights of the world’s energy 
industry over the last decade. The growth in shale gas 
production in the US since 2001 has led to significant 
changes in the national energy market. Until recently 
the United States appeared to be on the verge of beco-
ming one of the world’s largest importers of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG). 
However, the development of two innovative technologies – hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal drilling – has enabled the economical 
production of indigenous unconventional gas reserves in the US, leading 
to the emergence of larger domestic gas supplies, mainly coming from 
gas trapped in the shale formations (so-called shale gas). Today, shale gas 
represents around 20% (4,87 trillion cubic feet or 138 billion cubic 
meters) of the total US gas production, and it is expected to reach 50% 
by 20351. This growth is astonishing given that shale gas represented 
only 1% of the total US gas production in 20001. Due to shale gas 
developments, overall US natural gas production in 2009 overtook that 
of Russia, taking the world’s top producer position and transforming 
what had been the largest gas consumer to a potential gas exporter2. 
The successful development of shale gas in the US has intensified the 
search for these reserves globally. With regard to Europe, recently several 
European countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and others, have 
begun looking to shale gas as a means of improving national energy 
security and decreasing gas import dependence on Russia. Until now 
several shale gas exploration activities have already been initiated in 
Europe, however, the question whether the American shale gas success 
can be replicated in Europe still ends with a big question mark. 
This article aims at providing a broad overview of the shale gas potential 
in Europe and its current developments, giving an insight into the main 
challenges Europe might face with respect to shale gas production, and 
how these compare to the situation in the US. 
Shale gas developments in the US
The idea of producing natural gas from shale formations is not new. In 
small quantities, shale gas has been produced in the US since the 1940s3. 
However, due to the low productivity of shale wells and high costs, the 
production of this gas was considered a small-scale niche and therefore 
did not attract much attention from oil & gas majors. In essence, shale is 
an organic-rich sediment but, compared to a sandstone, which is a 
conventional reservoir of natural gas, shale has low porosity and 
permeability - poor properties for the production of gas and therefore 
resulting in a low well productivity. Techniques for natural gas 
production from shale formations have improved over time. However, 
1  CERA (2010). Fueling North America’s Energy Future. The Unconventional Natural Gas Revolution and the Carbon Agenda. Special report. Cambridge Energy Research Associates. 
2  Tallents, A. (2011). European gas supply and demand, and the outlook for shale gas. Analysis, Vol. 45. No.3.
3  Atlantic Council (2011). European unconventional gas developments. Environmental issues and regulatory challenges in the EU and the U.S.
4  Ivanov, N.A. (2010). Shale gas. FAQ. Material for the seminar “shale gas revolution: risks and opportunities for Russia”. 
5  Gas Strategies (2010). Shale gas in Europe: A revolution in the making? 
6  Dea, P.A. (2009). Abundant Natural Gas Supply. An American Treasure. Presentation materials at the ASPO 2009 International Peak Oil Conference. October 12, 2009. 
7  Data on world’s natural gas reserves. Avalable at http://dolgikh.com/index/0-39
Figure 1. Efficiency improvement in shale gas production. Best practices of Southwestern Energy 
Company in the Fayetteville shale formation 6
a significant breakthrough was reached only in 1991 when George 
Mitchell, the American geologist, combined the techniques of horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, allowing greater yields of shale gas, 
setting the stage for the American shale gas revolution4. 
Inherently, the horizontal drilling technique allows a greater length of 
the shale deposits to be in contact with the well bore, while hydraulic 
fracturing produces cracks in the reservoir, enhancing the migration of 
gas to the well bore. The use of these techniques was perfected by smaller 
companies and by oilfield service companies , eventually building the 
production of shale gas to levels where it became a significant part for the 
US gas industry. Today, shale gas represents about 20% (138 billion 
cubic meters) of the total US gas production, and it is expected to reach 
50% by 20351.
The developments in the shale gas industry can be demonstrated by the 
example of the Southwestern Energy Company practices in the 
Fayetteville shale from the first quarter of 2007 until the second quarter 
of 20096 (Figure 1). The figure shows that in just over two years, time 
requirements for drilling one horizontal well decreased by 45%, while 
the average length of a horizontal section of the well almost doubled, 
resulting in a significant increase of the average shale gas production rate. 
At the same time, the production costs (drilling and well completion 
costs) remained nearly unchanged. This partly can be explained by the 
fact that the production of shale gas in the US is located in a vicinity of 
gas consumers, in this way omitting gas transportation costs. With these 
improvements one rig could produce more wells on the annual basis, 
overall resulting in more then five-fold increase of the annual shale gas 
production6. This example might rise the question of the extent to which 
shale gas resources are limited in the US. The US Energy Information 
Agency (2011)12 estimates technically recoverable US shale gas reserves 
at 862 trillion cubic feet (24,5 trillion cubic meters), which is about 3 
times the amount of proven recoverable reserves of natural gas and 100 
years worth of consumption at present rates of usage7,8. 
3Trends in European gas supply
Facing the success story of shale gas developments in the US, various 
countries around the world hope to duplicate this success in their own 
territory. 
With regard to Europe, indigenous reserves of natural gas are declining 
and the following situation in gas market can be observed. In 2009, 
natural gas accounted for 25% of the primary energy need in Europe 
compared to only 10% in 1973, and this share is expected to grow in the 
future . According to a study of Weijermars et al. (2011), natural gas 
consumption in Europe is expected to reach 650bcm in 2020 and 
680bcm in 2030, while its indigenous production will decline from 
230bcm in 2020 to 140bcm (~130Mtoe) in 2030 (Figure 2). Statistics 
of the International Energy Agency (IEA) show that from the 22 
European OECD members, only Norway, Denmark and the 
Netherlands still have sufficiently large gas reserves to cover domestic 
demand10. This indicates that Europe is facing an increasing dependency 
on gas imports, including intercontinental LNG and pipeline gas. 
Already this year (2011), gas import accounted for nearly a half of 
Europe’s gas supply, and it is expected to reach 80% by 20309. Altogether 
this demonstrates the importance of shale gas development in Europe 
for the reduction of growing gas import dependency and energy security 
problems. However, there are many factors, which can hinder this 
development and need closer consideration (discussed later). Currently, 
exploration for shale gas across Europe is still in its infancy and no 
production is foreseen in the short term. 
European shale gas potential 
The first estimates of Europe’s unconventional gas resources in place 
were presented in a paper by Rogner (1997), who estimated some 1255 
Tfc GIIP, of which 549Tcf (15,3Tcm) would come from shale gas and 
remaining - from other sources of unconventional gas, such as tight gas 
and CBM (coal bed methane)11. The recent study of the US Energy 
Information Administration (2011)12, however, estimates 15Tcm of 
technically recoverable shale gas resources in Europe. The fact that the 
current estimates of technically recoverable shale gas are higher than 
GIIP estimates by Roger (1997) is partly due to the exclusion of Poland, 
Hungary and Romania from Roger’s assessment (particularly Poland, 
which holds a substantial shale gas resource base), since appraisals for 
these countries were not available at that time. Other sources13,14, also 
suggest that shale gas volumes are likely to outweigh the remaining 
conventional gas reserves in Europe, however the exact number still 
remains undetermined. 
According to Tallents (2011), around 50 companies are currently active 
in shale gas exploration in Europe, ranging from the majors, such as 
Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, Conoco Philips, and Chevron, to small state 
oil & gas companies (Figure 3). The majority are involved in data 
acquisition for appraisal purposes. A number of international oil 
companies, led by Exxon, have already obtained exploration licences in 
Poland, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Sweden and the UK, however, 
most of the majors have focused on Poland, where there are significant 
shale deposits with a geology similar to the Barnett Shale in Texas (first 
play, where the economical production of shale gas begun)5.
From all European countries Poland holds the largest shale gas reserves, 
nearly 5,3tcm10 (Figure 4). With the current annual consumption of 
14bcm, of which only five billion are produced within the Polish borders, 
shale gas reserves of such a scale could entirely sustain Polish gas needs 
for centuries to come and enhance energy security across the Central 
and Eastern European countries.
Given the country’s 70% gas import dependency on Russia, the 
government is keen to support shale gas development by evaluating 
reserves, offering attractive fiscal terms and issuing large numbers of 
licenses2. Until the present, around 100 licenses have been issued to 
international and state oil & gas companies for shale gas exploration and 
production , however, the deputy minister Maciej Grabowski has 
recently indicated that the potential commence of shale production can 
Figure 2. Projections of indigenous gas production and non-EU gas import for a panel of 25 EU 
Member States (excluding Norway) 9
8  Kefferputz, R. (2010). Shale Fever: Replicating the US gas revolution in the EU? CEPS Policy Brief No. 210. June 2010.
9  Weijermars, R., Drijkoningen, G., Heimovaara, T.J., et al. (2011). Unconventional gas research initiative fore clean energy transition in Europe. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, 3, 402-412. 
10  OECD/IEA (2010). Natural gas information 2010, International Energy Agency. 594 p.
11  Rogner, H. (1997). An assessment of world hydrocarbon resources. Annual review of energy and environment, 22,  217-262 . 
12  EIA. (2010). World shale gas resources: an initial assessment of 14 regions outside the United States.
13  CERA (2009). Multi-client study, gas from shale-potential outside North America? HIS Cambridge Energy Research Associates. February 2009. 
14  Geny, F (2010). Can unconventional gas be a game changer in European Gas Markets? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
15  Overbeek, E. (2011). Shale gas doesn’t make Poland the new Norway yet. European Energy Review, June 14, 2011. 
Figure 3. Shale gas exploration sites in Europe 2
416  http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article291801.ece
17  http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/polish-hydrocarbon-tax-in-2015-3776
18  http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/kulczyk-oil-ventures-announces-successful-fracking-in-ukraine-3324
19  Stevens, P. (2010). The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Hype and Reality. Chathamhouse. September 2010.
20  Barysch, K. (2010). Shale gas and energy security of the EU. Нефтегазовая Вертикаль, 18. 
21  Halliburton (2008). US shale gas: an unconventional resource. Unconventional challenges. White paper. Available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/Shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf
22  http://www.sjrwmd.com/watersupply/droughtproofwell.html
 
Figure 4. Estimates of technically recoverable shale gas resources in Europe 10
be expected at earliest in 2015 . The development of Polish shale gas is 
estimated to take longer than the US, partly due to the time needed to 
gain expertise, a lack of pipeline infrastructure and the necessity to 
address public concerns (discussed later). 
Next to Poland, the Ukraine is also putting a lot of effort into 
encouraging shale gas exploration activities, in order to decrease its 
energy dependency on Russia. According to Tallents (2011), in January 
2011, after resolution of several tax and licensing issues, it was 
announced that Shell would start shale exploration activities in the 
eastern Ukraine. TNK-BP is already exploring in the eastern Ukraine 
with the state owned Neftogaz Ukrainy. Meanwhile, other international 
companies are also getting involved in exploration activities in this 
region. Recent data show that the first hydraulic fracturing test in 
Ukraine has already been completed (the first of its kind in the eastern 
European country), resulting in shale gas flow rates of around 65 
thousand m3/day, which is a rather promising result.
Besides Poland and Ukraine, substantial shale gas reserves are found in 
such European countries as France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
Germany and Lithuania (Figure 4). However, there are various 
challenges in the way of their development. 
Europe’s main challenges 
One of the major potential problems in Europe with shale gas 
production is the geology, which is less promising than in the Unites 
States . In general, shale deposits in Europe are deeper and the basins 
themselves are smaller and more fragmented compared to those in the 
North America. According to Stevens (2010), European shales are 
richer in clay, making these deposits less amenable to hydraulic 
fracturing and hence economically less attractive. Kefferputs (2010) 
mentions that while the break-even gas price for some US shale plays is 
estimated between $3 and $7/mmbtu, for Europe this number would be 
above $10/mmbtu8. 
Another major obstacle facing Europe with shale gas production is the 
density of population, which is about 5 times higher than in the US. For 
economically viable shale gas production, several drilling rigs and wells 
are required to be placed relatively close to each other, together with new 
road and pipeline infrastructures . In this regard, Europe simply does not 
have much space compared to the US. In addition, Europe is lacking 
experience with shale gas production and facing significant equipment 
shortages. The US is a ‘home’ for many rig facilities companies and an 
experienced drilling workforce. In 2008, the US had more than 2000 
active onshore gas-drilling rigs while in Europe, as of April 2010, this 
number was only around 1008. 
Nevertheless, acceptance by local communities is likely to present the 
major challenge for the developments of shale gas in Europe. Not only is 
Europe more densely populated than the US, European citizens do not 
have any financial benefits from shale gas production on their land in 
comparison to the US situation. In the US, the mineral rights are owned 
by local residents, which they can sell, making a substantial profit. (For 
more about regulation, please read the piece by Professor Dianne Rahm 
from Texas State University) For instance, in the New York State some 
residents were offered $5500 an acre, with 20% royaltises on whatever 
gas is extracted8. On the contrary in many EU countries these rights are 
owned by the state, which leaves local residents with only few benefits8,19. 
In addition, one could argue that environmental awareness in the EU is 
higher than in the US, which could lead to a particularly strong public 
opposition due to possible contamination of drinking water supplies. 
Large quantities of water (about 20.000m3) in combination with sand 
and chemical additives are required to fracture one well (more about 
hydraulic fracturing, water use and environmental impacts of shale gas 
production read in the article of N. Rop in this Quarterly edition). Even 
though horizontal drilling occurs at a depth of around 1000 to 3000m 
(depending on the shale formation) and the deepest aquifer layer which 
could be used for drinking water purpose is located at around 200m , 
people have high concerns about potential groundwater contamination 
by the chemicals used in the process of hydraulic fracturing. France, 
which has the second largest shale gas reserves after Poland, has imposed 
a moratorium on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing until 
sufficient research on economic, social and environmental impact of 
shale gas development is performed. This decision was based on the 
strong opposition and protests from environmental organisations and 
residents living in the vicinity of proposed shale gas development 
activities2. In the US, this issue is also being raised more and more. For 
instance, officials in Philadelphia also asked their state regulator to ban 
hydraulic fracturing until its effects, particularly on drinking water, are 
sufficiently studied8. Currently, the chemicals used in hydraulic 
fracturing are exempted from the Safe Drinking Water Act of the US, 
making the technology more easily exploitable compared to the EU, 
where there is a set of strict environmental regulations2. At the moment 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is conducting a study 
on the impact of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water, taking a full 
life-cycle assessment into consideration. This study is expected to be 
ready by 2012. 
Concluding remarks
Despite the fact that several European countries have high hopes for 
shale gas developments and therefore reduction of their energy import 
dependency on Russia no shale gas production is currently taking place 
within Europe or is foreseen to emerge in upcoming years. In line with 
all the existing challenges, public acceptance currently remains the 
primary one to the development of shale gas in Europe. In case the 
current EPA research in the US concludes that hydraulic fracturing 
technique indeed poses a real danger regarding groundwater 
contamination and has other related environmental risks, this would 
likely to slow down European shale development even more. Altogether, 
it makes it fairly unlikely that a similar shale gas revolution will take place 
in the EU in the near-term, transforming its gas market in a similar way 
to that of the US. 
5In various European countries, discussions have taken 
place on the issue of whether the development of shale 
gas should be encouraged or not allowed. The debate 
mainly relates to the hydraulic fracturing technology 
to make shale gas wells producing economically viable 
amounts of gas. However, many people are still puzzled 
about what exactly hydraulic fracturing entails and 
how severe the environmental issues can be. This article 
tries to explain the technology and shed some light on 
the environmental issues.
Introduction
Shale gas has been produced in small quantities for decades. However, 
because of the low productivity and relative high production costs shale 
gas production has never attracted a lot of attention from the major gas 
companies. More recently, large scale shale gas production has been 
made possible because of developments in both ‘horizontal drilling’ and 
‘hydraulic fracturing’ technologies. 
Horizontal drilling is a technology to steer a drill bit into a horizontal 
direction to provide increased wellbore exposure to a shallow reservoir 
area while allowing for a reduced number of surface locations. 
Horizontal drilling is a well understood and accepted technology. Figure 
1 shows the difference between a horizontal and a vertical well. 
The other technology, hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, is becoming a 
major point of discussion because of the risks involved concerning 
ground water contamination and the use of large amounts of water.
To understand the need for hydraulic fracturing, first the differences 
between conventional and unconventional gas production have to be 
explained. Natural gas is formed by thermal transformation of an 
organic-rich source rock. With conventional natural gas, the gas migrates 
upwards until it is trapped in a porous reservoir from which it can be 
recovered by conventional (i.e. vertical) drilling. Gas production from 
conventional porous reservoirs has high productivity because the gas can 
migrate easily through the reservoir to the well bore (Gas Strategies, 
2010)
Shale gas and hydraulic fracturing: 
the issues explained
Shale gas plays, and other types of unconventional gas plays, are 
characterized by a source rock with low porosity and permeability where 
the gas was formed, which in addition acts as the gas containing 
reservoir. Because of the rock’s poor properties (i.e. porosity and 
permeability), gas doesn’t flow to the well bore easily, and therefore 
requires additional stimulation technologies like hydraulic fracturing. 
What is Hydraulic fracturing?
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique in which a mixture of water, 
chemicals, and sand are pumped into a well to unlock natural gas or oil 
trapped in shale formations, by creating cracks (fractures) in the rock 
and allowing the gas or oil to flow from the shale into the well. When 
used in conjunction with horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing usually 
enables gas producers to extract shale gas at a reasonable cost. While 
production of many conventional gas wells have been stimulated using 
hydraulic fracturing methods, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling 
is specifically required for shale wells to be productive enough to provide 
a sufficient financial return (Tyndall Centre, 2011).
The first step in drilling a shale gas well is drilling a vertical well until the 
depth of the shale deposit, generally two to three kilometres deep (well 
below usable groundwater aquifers). From here the drilling is redirected 
in a horizontal direction for about two to five kilometres. Horizontal 
drilling is necessary because shale gas layers are on average 200 meters 
thick, and vertical drilling would not provide enough surface contact to 
economically exploit the well. When the well is drilled and the well 
casings, required to isolate the overlying zones and to guarantee well 
integrity, are set, parts of the casing in the horizontal part of the well are 
perforated to allow the fracturing fluids to come in contact with the shale 
rock and to start the fracturing process. Next, a large amount of water 
mixed with sand and chemicals is pumped into the well to increase the 
pressure above the static level within the rock formation. When this 
pressure is reached the well gets temporarily plugged to maintain the 
pressure and achieve maximum fracturing results within the rock. The 
water pressure opens up extremely small cracks in the rocks, ‘fracturing’ 
the rock. The sand is used to fill these cracks or fractures so that they 
remain open when the pressure is relieved and chemicals are added to 
assist in the process or to protect the equipment. After the well is 
sufficiently fractured, the pressure is relieved and the water and 
chemicals are pumped out. Because of the sand the micro fractures will 
remain open and the gas can flow to the well more easily and faster 
resulting in a more economic gas well. Figure 2 shows the different stages 
in the fracturing process.
 
Figure 2: Hydraulic fractured horizontal well (not to scale) (Popular Science, 2011)
Niel Rop
Energy Analyst, Energy Delta Institute
Figure 1: Unconventional versus conventional gas production (DTE Energy, 2011)
6Hydraulic fracturing of shale gas wells
Hydraulic fracturing is often referred to as a technology that has been 
used for decades in conventional gas production, already starting in the 
1940s. However, there are some major differences between the way the 
technology was used now and in the past.
Hydraulic fracturing as it is now used on shale gas wells was developed in 
the late 1990s. It is called “slick-water hydraulic fracturing” because it 
uses a different mix of chemicals than the older methods, reducing the 
amount of gelling agents and adding friction reducers, making the fluid 
flow more easily. The modern technology is also known as “high-
volume” hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) because it uses much more fluid 
than the original hydraulic fracturing. With the original fracturing 
technology, typically 75 to 300 m3 of fluids were used each time a well 
was fractured, but HVHF uses on average 20.000 m3 of fluids, with as 
much as 30.000 m3 of fluids to fracture a well, the exact amount 
depending on the horizontal length of the well bore and the number of 
fractures created along it (TC Gasmap, 2011).
Fracturing fluids
Fracture fluids can be based on water, oil, acid, gel, foam and even liquid 
CO2. Most fracturing work is conducted using a water based fluid. In 
addition, fracture fluids can contain a wide array of additives, each with a 
particular function, the combination depending on the conditions of the 
specific well being targeted. For deep shale gas zones, the water is 
commonly mixed with a friction reducer (called slickwater), biocides, 
scale inhibitors, and proppants such as sand to hold the fracture open. It 
is the use of such additives that has raised concerns about hydraulic 
fracturing, even though overall the concentration of additives in most 
slickwater fracturing fluids ranges between 0.5% and 2%, with water and 
sand making up 98% to 99.5% of the slickwater (Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, 2010). Geology dictates the combination of fracturing 
fluids and proppant used, and part of the challenge of unlocking new 
plays involves determining the optimal stimulation treatment. Figure 3 
shows the typical make-up of a basic fracturing fluid, including the 
different kinds of chemicals used.
 
Figure 3: Sample Fracture Fluid Composition 
(NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, 2011)
Even though it is commonly claimed that the chemicals used are 
common household products they may still have an adverse impact on 
the environment. For instance, some of the used chemicals are also used 
in anti-freeze products. 
Environmental impacts of shale gas production
A recent report of the Tyndall Centre (2011) assessed the possible risks 
and impacts of hydraulic fracturing and shale gas drilling. Some key risks 
and impacts directly relating to hydraulic fracturing were identified and 
explained below:
•	 Groundwater	pollution:	The	potential	for	contamination	of	
groundwater is a key risk associated with hydraulic fracturing. 
Commonly used fracturing fluids contain multiple chemical additives, 
some of which are toxic to humans. Groundwater pollution may occur 
if there is a catastrophic failure or loss of integrity of the wellbore, or if 
contaminants can travel from the target fracture through subsurface 
pathways. The risks of such pollution were seen as minimal from 
properly constructed wells. However, the risks related to less properly 
constructed wells are less well documented and may be more 
significant. 
•	 Surface	pollution:	While	it	may	not	always	be	possible	to	pinpoint	the	
exact cause of groundwater contamination, identifying the source for 
land and surface water pollution is more straightforward. There are a 
number of potential sources of pollution including: well cuttings and 
drilling mud; chemical additives for the fracturing liquid; and 
flowback fluid, the liquid containing toxic chemicals that returns to 
the surface after fracturing. There are various routes by which these 
potential sources can cause pollution.
•	 Water	consumption:	Hydraulic	fracturing	requires	very	significant	
amounts of water. To carry out all fracturing operations on a six well 
pad takes between some 50 and 170 thousand cubic metres of water. 
For the annual production of 5 bcm of shale gas over 20 years this 
would boil down to an average annual water demand of 700-3000 
thousand cubic metres.
•	 Disposal	of	flowback	fluids:	After	a	shale	gas	well	is	fractured,	between	
25 and 80% of the fluids will return to the surface before and during 
gas production. These fluids still contain most of the chemicals 
initially used, as well as heavy metals and radioactive elements from 
the fractured layers. Treating or disposing of these fluids is expensive, 
and if not done properly they can contaminate surface or drinking 
water. 
•	 Seismic	events:	Seismic	events,	or	earthquakes,	have	in	some	instances	
been reported to be caused by hydraulic fracturing (Daly, 2011). 
Examples of earthquakes after hydraulic fracturing are small seismic 
events in the UK (Vukmanovic, 2011), and a strong rise in seismic 
events in Oklahoma, where a lot of fracturing has been performed 
(Daly, 2011). However, these are only small events, and have always 
been part of natural gas production and other sub surface industries.
The above risks directly associated with hydraulic fracturing are not the 
only issues related to shale gas production, particularly when considering 
relatively densely populated areas such as northwest Europe. More ‘run 
of the mill’ impacts such as vehicle movements, landscape and noise 
pollution may also be of significant concern locally, especially when 
considering the scale of development required to deliver significant 
supplies. 
Technological developments
Because of tightening regulations and growing public awareness of the 
risks of hydraulic fracturing, the industry is working on better and 
cleaner processes for hydraulic fracturing. However, not all of the issues 
are easily solved, especially not those relating to the scale of the industry. 
The new developments at this moment are mainly focused on limiting 
the use of water and toxic chemicals. Limiting the use of water can be 
done by: 
•	 Better	wastewater	treatment	and	reuse,	making	it	possible	to	use	the	
same water for multiple fracturing stages, and decreasing the net 
amount of required water;
7•	 Using	a	foam	as	part	of	the	fracturing	fluid,	potentially	reducing	the	
required amount of water with up to 95% (Gies, 2011); 
•	 Using	liquefied	propane	gas	(LPG)	instead	of	water,	which	is	actually	
a thick gel. The gel purportedly turns to vapour underground, then 
returns to the surface with the gas where it can be collected and 
possibly reused (Gies, 2011).
For limiting the use of toxic chemicals, the fracturing companies search 
for information about offshore fracturing fluids, which are not allowed to 
be toxic to marine live, and so do not contain any toxic chemicals 
(Earthworks, 2011). Off course, all of these measure will come at a cost, 
making drilling more expensive.
Conclusion
Like every energy source, shale gas has its drawbacks. The process 
involves injecting large amounts of water and chemicals deep 
underground. If done right, this should not contaminate freshwater 
supplies or cause other environmental problems. Rogue companies, 
however have cut corners in the past, causing environmental problems 
and contributing to increased controversy surrounding fracturing. 
The problems relating to hydraulic fracturing are real, but according to a 
variety of sources do not seem to be insurmountable. For instance, an 
exhaustive study from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
concluded, “With 20,000 shale wells drilled in the last 10 years, the 
environmental record of shale-gas development is for the most part a 
good one” (Brooks, 2011). 
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8The ability to economically produce natural gas from 
unconventional shale gas reservoirs has been made 
possible recently through the application of horizon-
tal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Texas is a major 
player in these developments. Of the eight states and 
coastal areas that account for the bulk of U.S. gas, 
Texas has the largest proved reserves. 
Texas’ Barnett Shale already produces six percent of the continental U.S.’ 
gas and exploration of Texas’ other shale gas regions is just beginning. 
Shale gas production is highly controversial, in part because of 
environmental concerns. This paper explores the regulatory framework 
for hydraulic fracturing of shale gas plays in Texas. 
In its 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) estimates that the recoverable gas resources from 
U.S. shale gas plays have more than doubled in the past year, in large part 
due to the successful use of advanced drilling techniques. Indeed, the 
report forecasts that by 2035 almost half (45 percent) of the natural gas 
produced in the U.S. will come from shale gas, up from 14 percent in 
2009 (Energy Information Administration, 2011). Over the last few 
years new drilling techniques are remapping the energy future of the U.S. 
These new drilling techniques have opened vast quantities of natural gas. 
Estimates suggest these new reserves will amount to 616 trillion cubic 
feet (17,248 billion cubic meters) -- about the same as Kuwait’s proven 
reserves (Cox, 2010). 
 While conventional sources of natural gas are declining, unconventional 
sources like shale gas are rapidly increasing. Instead of facing dwindling 
reserves of conventional natural gas, the application of horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing (HF or fracking) techniques in shale gas 
reservoirs has turned the U.S. from a nation of waning gas production to 
one of increasing production. Texas is forecast to be a key state 
contributing to U.S. natural gas supplies in the future. 
The use of fracking and the gas drilling boom that has resulted from its 
use has led, however, to some controversy and environmental worries. 
Concern centers not only around air emissions and potential water 
contamination associated with fracking chemicals used, but also around 
the substantial amount of water necessary to make the wells productive. 
Additionally, apprehension extends to chemical waste management 
practices, the large land footprint of drilling operations, and the 
necessary infrastructure required to support these large drilling 
operations. 
Why Texas Matters
The state of Texas contains five major shale gas plays and has assumed a 
critical role in demonstrating the new HF drilling technology. The largest 
of the Texas’ plays, the Barnett play, is located in north central Texas. 
Nationally, this was the first play to be exploited. Between 2005 and 
2007, almost all completed horizontal HF wells were successful in the 
Barnett Shale play. Texas is also site of the Haynesville Shale play in the 
eastern part of the state along the Texas-Louisiana border. This site is 
expected to be the largest national producer over the coming decade. 
The Eagle Ford Shale play, located just south of San Antonio, is the 
newest site to begin production and is also expected to be a significant 
producer. Texas also is home to the Barnett-Woodford Shale in the west 
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and the Bend Shale play in the Panhandle. 
Production of shale gas in Texas is increasing rapidly. In 2007, Texas 
produced 988 billion cubic feet (27.66 billion cubic meters) of shale gas. In 
2009, production rose to 1,789 billion cubic feet (50 billion cubic meters). 
That production accounted for 57 percent of the 3,110 billion cubic feet (87 
billion cubic meters) of shale gas produced in the United States that year 
(Energy Information Administration, 2010). Estimates of proved shale gas 
reserves within Texas continue to rise at the same steep rate. 
The Regulatory Tangle of Texas
While other states have moved legislatively or administratively to control 
shale gas drilling within their jurisdictions, the regulatory climate of Texas 
has thus far prevented any similar action in the Lone Star State. Where some 
efforts have been attempted, they have not gone far. The reasons are 
interrelated and primarily due to the fragmentation of the regulatory 
bureaucracy, a fundamental anti-regulatory disposition, and a well-
entrenched legal and administrative structure that promotes oil and gas 
extraction above other concerns. 
In Texas, multiple commissions and authorities have a role to play in 
jurisdiction over mineral, water, air, and land regulation. But unlike states 
like California, that also have a fragmented structure, Texas does not have a 
strong ethos of environmental protectionism. Moreover, under the 
leadership of Governor Rick Perry, Texas has taken a decidedly anti-EPA and 
anti-federal regulation position. 
Within Texas, environmental pollution issues typically fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. TCEQ is 
the agency that deals with air and water quality issues as the state agency 
given primacy for implementing federal clean water and air laws. TCEQ, 
however, has recently found itself in conflict with the EPA over what EPA 
considers lax enforcement of the federal Clean Air Act. In a most unusual 
step, in March of 2010, EPA disapproved Texas’ air permitting exemption 
program (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010a). The Qualified 
Facilities exemption rule was submitted by TCEQ to EPA as part of the 
required State Implementation Plan (SIP). The rule allows certain facilities 
that have Texas permits to avoid following federal Clean Air Act 
requirements. EPA rejected the permitting plan and told Texas to change the 
SIP to bring it into compliance with Clean Air Act requirements (Galbraith, 
2010). Texas refused and the standoff began. The Governor and the TCEQ 
argue that the federal government is meddling in Texas’ business and is 
involved in an unconstitutional overreach. 
Tension between the TCEQ and the EPA escalated later in 2010 when Texas 
became the only state to refuse to implement EPA’s greenhouse gas 
regu l ations. While several other U.S. states have joined with Texas in suing 
the EPA over its efforts to regulate greenhouse gases, Texas is the only state 
that has refused to create a state program to implement the federal rules. In 
December, EPA announced that it would seize authority and issue Clean Air 
Act greenhouse gas permits in Texas because of Texas’ unwillingness to do so 
(Michaels, 2010). Texas appealed to the courts and continued to fight the 
EPA but as of November 2011, EPA began issuing greenhouse gas permits 
for Texas. 
EPA has pushed TCEQ to consider air emissions in the Barnett Shale. 
Responding to complaints from citizens of Dish, Texas EPA began an 
investigation of toxic air emissions in 2010. The TCEQ also conducted a 
study of air quality in the Barnett Shale. They found elevated levels of 
benzene and other chemicals. TCEQ recommended long-term monitoring 
(Vaughan and Pursell, 2010). Subsequently, the TCEQ put in place a 
9two-phase monitoring study to examine air emissions in the Barnett 
Shale (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2010). But drilling 
continues.
Conflict with the EPA has spilled over to another Texas agency, the 
Texas Railroad Commission. Under Texas law, the Railroad Commission 
(RRC) regulates the oil and gas industry including pipeline transporters. 
It is responsible for community safety and stewardship of natural 
resources, while at the same time one of its missions is to promote 
“enhanced development and economic vitality” (Railroad Commission 
of Texas, 2011a). Given its dual purposes, some would suggest that the 
missions of community safety and of stewardship of natural resources 
fall victim to that of promoting the oil and gas industry. 
The RRC has come into conflict with the EPA for its lax enforcement of 
the Safe Drinking Water Act. In December of 2010, EPA issued an 
Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Order to protect drinking 
water in Southern Parker County. By this order the EPA ordered a 
natural gas company operating in the Barnett Shale to take immediate 
action to protect the water wells of local residents. EPA testing confirmed 
the presence of flammable substances in the drinking water. By issuing 
this order, the EPA trumped the RRC which had done nothing in 
response to complaints from homeowners (Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2010b). 
Air and water quality issues are not the only regulatory concerns in 
Texas. In an arid state like Texas, water quantity is a key issue. When it 
comes to determining adequacy of water supplies, multiple authorities 
exercise overlapping jurisdiction. These include the more than three 
dozen river authorities and special law districts, multiple aquifer 
authorities, nearly 100 Groundwater Conservation Districts, sixteen 
Groundwater Management Areas, and seven Priority Groundwater 
Management Areas, myriad water utilities, municipalities, and counties. 
In addition, the Texas Water Development Board and its regional 
planning committees are responsible for producing a 50 year plan for 
water resources, updated every 5 years. However, when it comes to use of 
groundwater use for drilling gas or oil wells, these regulatory bodies have 
no authority. 
The RRC allows a company to use as much groundwater as it needs to 
complete a well (Railroad Commission of Texas, 2011b). Drillers that 
wish to use surface water do need to apply to TCEQ for a permit. The 
first such application was filed in 2010 for use of San Antonio River 
water for a fracking operation in the Eagle Ford Shale. The permit seeks 
65 million gallons a year for ten years (Harman, 2010). The use of such 
vast amounts of water raises some concerns especially in dryer parts of 
the state but thus far there are few attempts to control the water use. 
Groundwater is specifically exempted from control under the state’s 
water code.
In Texas, surface land property rights can be separated from mineral 
rights and mineral rights supersede property rights. Natural gas is 
classified as a mineral. The separation of surface rights from mineral 
rights can happen in several ways. Either the landowner sells the 
minerals but retains the surface or the landowner retains the minerals 
but sells the surface. In Texas, the latter is more common. The language 
regarding the terms of the sale is recorded on the deed. If the seller fails 
to reserve the minerals when selling the surface, the mineral ownership 
goes automatically to the buyer and the transaction is considered a fee 
simple estate. Whether the surface and mineral estates are separated on a 
tract of land or not, in Texas mineral rights are dominant. This is because 
to benefit from the ownership of minerals, access to the surface of the 
land is essential. If mineral ownership did not have priority over surface 
rights in law, then mineral rights would be worthless for the mineral 
owner could not enter the land to explore and extract the minerals 
(Fambrough, 2009). 
Because the surface of the land must be disturbed so that minerals may 
be accessed, this can create a tension between surface land property 
owners and mineral rights owners. It is important to note that often the 
same individual owns both the surface and mineral rights, in which case 
no conflict would ensue.  Mineral rights owners are permitted by Texas 
law to lease the rights to explore for oil and gas to a company which in 
turn must provide the surface land owner a notification of intent to 
explore and drill. In Texas, though, the surface land owner cannot block 
the mineral rights owner from access to the minerals. Mineral rights 
owners can use as much surface land as is reasonably necessary to 
explore, drill, and extract minerals. The mineral rights owner is allowed 
by Texas law to clear trees and remove fences so that drilling rigs can be 
brought to the property. Once gas is discovered, the mineral owner can 
bring in extraction equipment on a dedicated pad that can be an acre or 
more in size. The mineral rights owner or lessee may also erect pipelines 
for the removal of minerals. Texas law does not require the mineral 
owner or lessee to pay for damages to the land or to pay reparations for 
the loss of use of the land while the drilling operation is in place (Woods, 
2010). 
In Texas, private gas pipeline companies have been given the right of 
eminent domain by state statute, which in practicality allows them to lay 
lines where ever they choose. That interstate pipeline companies have 
the power of eminent domain is established in federal law. Interstate 
natural gas transmission pipeline companies were given the power of 
eminent domain by the federal Natural Gas Act of 1938. An interstate 
pipeline company may use the power of eminent domain if the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has issued a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity for a pipeline project and the company 
has not been able to successfully negotiate a purchase price with the 
property owner (Arntsen and Simmons, 2009). Intrastate pipelines are 
generally regulated by state Public Utility Commissions. States vary on 
the authority given to intrastate pipeline operators. In most states, 
intrastate pipelines and gathering pipelines -- lines that take the gas from 
the wells to a larger transmission line -- do not have eminent domain 
authority (Killion, 2010). In Texas, however, pipeline companies have 
considerable sway. 
In Texas, pipeline operators and gas utilities have the power of eminent 
domain. The Railroad Commission does not have any right to regulate 
any pipeline with respect to the exercise of eminent domain (Railroad 
Commission of Texas, 2010). If a company wants to cross private 
property to lay a pipeline, they are allowed to do so. If they take the 
entire property through condemnation, they were required under the 
1936 case State v. Carpenter to provide fair market value for the land 
(Brannan and Peacock, 2010). However, in 2004, the Texas Supreme 
Court ruled in Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co. that the 
dollar amount of the condemning agent’s offer does not have to align 
with fair market value for the land. Further, even if the party whose land 
is being taken wins in a court appeal, the attorney fees and appraiser fees 
cannot be recovered as part of the judgment (Fambrough, 2010). These 
aspects of Texas policy make opposing mineral development difficult 
and costly.
 
Conclusion
Taken together these provisions and actions constitute a very friendly 
environment for oil and gas producers in the state of Texas. Unlike 
actions in other states and at the federal level to control horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, Texas remains pretty much “the wild 
West.” The fragmentation of the Texas regulatory bureaucracy, a 
fundamental anti-regulatory disposition of the TCEQ and the Governor, 
and the well-entrenched legal and administrative structures that promote 
oil and gas extraction above other concerns make Texas a strong 
pro-drilling state. While land owners who lease their mineral rights to oil 
and gas companies stand to gain significant income from such leases, 
once the lease is negotiated landowners have few protections. How much 
water will be used, the disposal of wastewater, and the footprint of 
drilling operations are not under their control. What will remain of the 
rural land that passes to future generations is unclear. And urban dwellers 
who find themselves unexpectedly living in a gas field will have to deal 
with the development and production. 
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After decades of speculation, recent advances in drilling 
technologies coupled with high prices for natural gas 
have made it economical to extract natural gas from 
shale rock formations deep below the surface of the 
earth. The process, which involves horizontal drilling 
and the hydraulic fracturing of shale rock, requires the 
construction of drilling pads, large quantities of water 
to fracture the shale rock, and methods for treating or 
disposing the water that returns to the surface. 
Because such unconventional gas reserves often lie below regions 
previously familiar to the energy industry, and because potential threats 
to the natural environment are not well understood, policy makers face 
large uncertainties over how best to prepare for and regulate the industry. 
Responses have varied dramatically within the United States. The 
governments in Texas and Arkansas, states already familiar with the 
conventional (shallow well) gas extraction industry, largely relied upon 
existing regulations. But in the state of New York, where the gas industry 
traditionally has had little activity, a moratorium on unconventional gas 
extraction was enacted until more could be learned.
Of particular interest to policy makers in all regions are the expected 
economic benefits associated with the new industry. Job creation, state 
tax revenue earnings, and overall economic growth typically top the list 
of economic impacts of interest. The Economic Impact Report is a 
particularly useful tool for estimating these impacts, and the gas industry 
often funds the research behind these reports. But the Economic Impact 
Report involves several layers of subjective decision making, overlooks a 
host of other relevant economic impacts, and is based on a core 
economic theory that may not be appropriate in all cases. This article 
explains how the Economic Impact Report is generated, discusses some 
of the weaknesses of the practice, and then introduces some of the other 
known economic consequences of unconventional gas extraction that 
could prove important to policy makers.
The Economic Impact Report
Many policymakers, private consultants, and academic and professional 
economists are familiar with the Economic Impact Report. These reports 
estimate the jobs, gross revenues, and tax revenues associated with the 
economic activity of a single firm, a single institution, or any particular 
industry. Economic impacts result from the direct, indirect, and induced 
economic activity associated with the firm, institution, or industry. 
Direct economic effects are estimated by simply examining the financial 
statements of the firm or industry. All revenues earned, jobs created, and 
taxed paid are said to have a direct effect on the economy. Indirect 
economic effects occur when the firm or industry purchases supplies, 
raw materials, and labor resources from other firms in the economy. This 
spending indirectly contributes to the jobs, revenues, and taxes paid by 
these other firms. Induced effects arise after incomes earned from the 
beneficiaries of the indirect spending are then spent again and again 
throughout the economy. These induced effects are estimated using 
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multipliers generated from any number of input-output models created 
by professional economists.
A number of Economic Impact Reports have been produced to estimate 
the economic benefits of unconventional gas extraction in the United 
States.1 The intended audiences of these reports are often local and 
regional policy makers. If policy makers can be convinced that the new 
industry will generate sufficient increases in jobs, tax receipts, and 
economic growth, then those policy makers may be less likely to 
implement safety and environmental regulations. Also, because these 
impact reports can specify the economic benefits within any defined 
state or region, they especially match the political interests of many state 
policy makers.
That direct, indirect, and induced spending might generate broad 
economic prosperity originated with the theories of the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes in the 1930’s. Keynesian economic 
theory is most appropriate for understanding economies operating 
below capacity when economic resources are underemployed, such as 
during the Great Depression and during the present ongoing recession. 
Although Keynesian economic theory is an important part of the 
curriculum at many colleges and universities across the globe and 
remains important to both modern empirical and theoretical research, 
academic research economists have abandoned the practice of writing 
Economic Impact Reports. Such reports are no longer considered 
economic research suitable for publication in the academic journals. 
Instead private consulting companies and academic economists looking 
to make a few consulting dollars on the side author Economic Impact 
Reports for clients in industry and government.
One reason for the lack of interest from professional research economists 
for the Economic Impact Report is the high level of subjectivity inherent 
to the practice. For example, important to the estimate of the indirect 
effects to any specific region is determining the portion of a firm or 
institution’s overall spending on resources from local, rather than non 
local suppliers. The purchase of an imported automobile from a local car 
dealership will likely have a different economic impact than the purchase 
of a domestic automobile from the same dealership. But the economist 
might only be given the zip code of the car dealership when determining 
whether a purchase is local or not and is therefore unable to distinguish 
between these two purchases. With thousands of purchases per year, the 
process of identifying truly local suppliers may become impossible. Also, 
once the indirect spending from local vendors is “estimated”, then the 
induced effects are estimated by selecting an appropriate spending 
multiplier from several possibilities with little guidance over which 
multiplier is most appropriate. Finally, the output of the Economic 
Impact Report assumes no crowding out – all economic resources 
employed to support the firm or industry’s spending are otherwise idle 
and therefore not reallocated from other sectors of the economy. This 
last assumption may only be appropriate in an economy awash with 
unemployed economic resources. In combination, these sources of 
subjectivity allow the economist substantial leeway when completing an 
Economic Impact Report, reduce the process from a science to perhaps 
an art, and result in the repeated use of the word “conservative” in the 
report to attempt to convince the reader that wherever judgments were 
made, options were pursued that minimized the economic impacts.
1wFor a detailed review of these reports, see “The Economic Impact of Shale Gas Extraction: A Review of Existing Studies,” published in Ecological Economics 70(7), May 2011, 1243-1249.
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But perhaps the most disappointing aspect of traditional Economic 
Impact Statement involves what is omitted. First, who wins and who 
loses? A new industry may drive some existing firms and industries out 
of the economy while others may emerge. These details are usually of 
interest, but Economic Impact Reports by design suggest everyone will 
benefit from the extra spending. Second, the sustainability of the 
estimated economic impacts is ignored. Will the economic benefits be 
short lived or long lasting? Third, the economic impact report fails to 
consider the national and international benefits and costs that mat 
originate from a firm, institution, or industry. 
The remainder of this article attempts to address these additional 
questions. Data from the United States Economic Census are 
summarized in the next section to see what effect the maturing industry 
has had on the state and local economy. Have the benefits touted by the 
Economic Impact Reports been realized? A description of the specific 
winners and losers, as identified in the economics literature, is then 
provided in the section that follows further below. The final section then 
summarizes the broad benefits and costs to the national and global 
economies stemming from this industry.
Moving Beyond the Economic Impact Report
Rather than relying upon spending forecasts to understand the 
economic impacts of the unconventional gas industry, Table 1 
summarizes observed economic variables both before and after the 
initiation of the industry in U.S. states both with and without the 
industry. All data are obtained from the United States Economic Census, 
which is taken every five years. Two time periods are reported. The first 
time period, from 1997-2002, predates almost all unconventional gas 
activity in the United States. The second time period, 2002-2007, 
featured significant mining activity in both the Barnett shale play in 
Texas and the Fayetteville shale play in Arkansas. The limited data points 
are woefully insufficient for making any statistical inference about the 
overall economic impact of the industry. But if the industry is 
responsible for sizeable economic gains, then these data should recover 
something.
Extraction from the Fayetteville shale play in Arkansas began in 2002. 
Prior to 2002, employment in the mining sector of the economy grew by 
an average annual rate of 4.52% in the state of Arkansas (the first row of 
Table 1). Gross revenues to mining companies grew by an averaged 
annual rate of 3.12%. Both of these measures increased sharply in the five 
years between 2002 and 2007. Employment in the mining industry grew 
by an average annual rate of 13.59% and gross revenues to the mining 
industry grew on average by almost 40% per year. This rapid increase in 
average growth rates within the mining sector also emerges in Texas, site 
of the Barnett shale play since 2001.
At question is the extent to which this rapid growth within the mining 
industry extends to the broader state economies. Table 1 also has the 
pre- and post-2002 average employment and gross revenue growth rates 
for the states of Arkansas and Texas. Similar data are also obtained for 
the states of New Mexico and Tennessee, two south-central states 
adjacent to Texas and Arkansas but not served by the unconventional gas 
extraction industry. The average annual growth rate of employment 
decreased in both Arkansas and Texas after 2002, as was the case in New 
Mexico. Unobserved macroeconomic variables are likely the reason. But 
if the decreases observed in Arkansas and Texas are less severe than the 
decreases in Tennessee and New Mexico, then the new uncon ventional 
gas industry could be responsible for relative gains in economic 
performance. 
Using the differences in differences approach, the economies of Texas 
and Arkansas together experienced a 0.97 point decrease in the average 
growth rate in employment. Tennessee and New Mexico experienced an 
averaged 1.78 point decrease. If no other economic variables affected 
these latter two economies any differently than the economies of Texas 
and Arkansas, then we can conclude that the unconventional gas 
industry was responsible for an annual 0.8 point increase in the growth 
rate of employment between 2002 and 2007. The Arkansas economy 
employed 926,150 workers in 2002, thus the 0.8 percent annual increase 
suggests the addition of 7,409 jobs per year created by the uncon-
ventional gas industry during the 2002 to 2007 period. The Economic 
Impact Report for the state of Arkansas (published by the Center for 
Business and Economic Research of the University of Arkansas) 
predicted the addition of 9,533 jobs in Arkansas. In terms of gross 
revenues, the differences in differences approach suggests that gross 
revenues in Texas and Arkansas grew at an average rate that exceeded 
that in Tennessee and New Mexico by 3.25%.
Table 1: A Comparison of State Economic Indicators
Employment and gross revenue data are also obtained for specific 
counties within Texas and Arkansas, and are reported in Table 2. Within 
Arkansas, unconventional gas extraction from the Fayetteville shale play 
occurs in both Faulkner and White counties but not in Garland or Saline 
counties. The differences and differences approach when applied to these 
two sets of counties suggests the average growth rate in employment 
decreased by 4.98% in the shale counties and decreased by only 0.99% in 
the non-shale counties – contradicting the results based on statewide 
data given above. These data suggest the unconventional gas industry is 
responsible for a 3.99 point decrease in the employment growth rate in 
these two counties. A decrease of 0.27 points is estimated using counties 
in Texas. A comparison of the growth rates of gross revenues suggests 
shale counties in Texas and Arkansas also experienced lower growth in 
gross revenues that counties without shale. 
Thus, the data suggest that state economies grow but local (country-
wide) economies suffer from the unconventional gas industry. But 
problems are associated with these conclusions. First, unobserved 
economic variables may have affected the shale states and counties in 
ways that differ from how they affected the non shale states and counties 
– the appearance of the shale gas industry may not be the only difference 
between these sets of states and counties. Statistical techniques could be 
utilized to control for these other variables, but such techniques require 
larger data sets than are reported in Tables 1 and 2. And because the 
industry is rather new, such data are not yet available. Thus, the actual 
impact the industry is having on the local and state economies remains 
largely unknown. 
Specific Economic Impacts Associated with Unconventional 
Gas Extraction
Moving beyond the impact on aggregate economic performance, the 
remainder of this essay summarizes what we have learned about the 
specific economic impacts within various sectors of the economy. The 
literature is admittedly thin at this point as post-industry data are only 
Location 1997-2002 2002-2007
Arkansas - Mining Industry Employment: 4.52% Employment: 13.59%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 3.12% Revenues: 38.98%
Texas - Mining Industry Employment: 1.52% Employment: 17.28%
Barnett Shale (began 2001) Revenues: 4.17% Revenues: 20.45%
Arkansas - All Industries Employment: 1.16% Employment: 0.97%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 2.18% Revenues: 9.41%
Texas - All Industries Employment: 4.41% Employment: 2.67%
Barnett Shale (began 2001) Revenues: 2.52% Revenues: 12.51%
New Mexico - All Industries Employment: 6.21% Employment: 2.61%
No Shale Activity Revenues: 3.46% Revenues: 11.00%
Tennessee - All Industries Employment: 1.13% Employment: 1.18%
No Shale Activity Revenues: 3.07% Revenues: 6.25%
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now becoming available to researchers. The most thorough examination 
of the economic impacts of the industry is performed by Susan 
Christopherson of Cornell University. The full report is available at 
http://www.greenchoices.cornell.edu/development/marcellus/. Some 
of these results are summarized below.
Economic Effects on Landowners
The majority of unconventional gas reserves lie below privately owned 
rural property. In order to access these natural gas sources, mining 
companies must first gain permission from the surface land owners. The 
typical contract includes both a lease agreement and future royalty 
payments. The lease agreement stipulates a monthly amount paid to the 
landowner for permission to construct a mining pad and access road. 
Royalties are then paid on each unit of natural gas extracted at the site. 
These lease and royalty agreements are usually kept confidential in the 
short run. Thus, neighboring property owners can negotiate very 
different terms. Lease payments have ranged substantially between just 
$50 to as much as $7,000 per acre per year. Royalty agreements have 
varied between 12% and 21%. Although the process yields a few 
overnight millionaires, the average landowner receives a few thousand 
dollars per year. Furthermore, a well pad on a property has been 
estimated to reduce the value of the property by 8.67% in Garfield 
County, Colorado. Apparently prospective land buyers are unimpressed 
by the mining activity on the property.
Neighboring landowners whose surface property may not be conducive 
to drilling due perhaps to inadequate size, severe land grade, or flood 
plain issues must experience the nuisance of drilling on neighboring 
properties without gaining lease or royalty revenues. Although economic 
studies estimating these external costs have not materialized in the 
literature, studies estimate that each well pad involves an estimated 890 
to 1,340 truck trips. Related economics literature has estimated that 
vehicular traffic negatively affects adjacent property values.
Economic Impact on Housing
The unconventional gas mining industry typically imports trained labor 
from other regions of the country. Short-term housing demand therefore 
increases sharply. Rents have been estimated to increase by 60% in the 
short run in some rural areas. Vacancy rates plummet, and many 
low-income residents are displaced by the industry. These effects are 
most noticeable in medium sized municipalities large enough to be 
attractive to the imported labor force but not large enough to offer 
sufficient quantities of housing.
At question is how long the increase in housing demand will persist. 
Studies of housing values suggest a boom/bust cycle may accompany the 
industry. Once well drilling and pipe line construction has been 
completed in any specific area, the imported labor force migrates to 
another region. Experiences suggest this cycle takes about 6 years to 
complete. For example, in Grand Junction, Colorado, vacancy rates 
decreased from 10% in 2004 to 2% in 2008 with the emergence of the 
unconventional gas industry. But vacancy rates then increased back to 
10% between 2008 and 2010. The same pattern emerged in Glenwood 
Springs, Colorado as vacancy rates decreased from 6% to 1% but then 
back to 4% over the same time frame. No such cycle exists in state-wide 
data for Colorado.
Housing prices followed this same pattern. Again in Grand Junction, 
Colorado, housing prices traditionally grew at about the state average of 
2% per year. With the emergence of the unconventional gas industry, 
housing prices began to grow by 10% more than the state average 
between 2003 and 2008. But since 2008, housing prices decreased by 
double digit percentage rates even as the state average held steady. These 
observations suggest the increased demand for housing associated with 
unconventional gas extraction is short lived.
Impact on Public Services
The emergence of the unconventional gas industry in rural regions of the 
country can put unexpected pressures on public services. Many 
municipalities can absorb rates of population growth of up to about 6% 
to 7%. Systematic institutional breakdowns occur with population 
growth rates of 15%, a rate that can accompany the new industry. Health 
and education systems, road maintenance, emergency services, social 
services, public administration services, and environmental monitoring 
services are most sensitive to the emerging industry.
Impact on Local Labor Markets
Most new employment opportunities for the local labor force associated 
with the unconventional gas industry are in trucking. Aggregate 
materials for pad development, tools and supplies for drilling, and 
pipeline construction materials require the use of trucks. Once the 
drilling begins, trucks are needed to transport water and drill casing 
materials. Trucks are also necessary for transporting earth and waste 
water for proper disposal (in some cases over long distances). The 
demand for trucking is so intense in some areas that other industries 
relying on trucking services are affected. The dairy industry is 
particularly crowded out in many rural regions. Other local employment 
opportunities associated with the unconventional gas industry are in 
food service and hotel/motel accommodations. 
But the high-skilled well-paying jobs are usually reserved for imported 
labor forces that have developed long lasting relationships with the 
mining company. These workers construct the well pads, construct the 
pipelines, operate the drilling process, and capture the gas. Although 
local labor forces could be trained to fill some of these jobs, the 
transitory nature of the industry would eventually take local employees 
to other parts of the country once they become skilled in the industry 
– a form of brain drain that might likely result from any investment in the 
local labor force.
Crowding Out
The impact on the dairy industry mentioned above is one form of 
economic crowding out that can occur with the emergence of the 
unconventional gas industry. Crowding out can also be associated with 
land used by the industry. First, farm production has been shown to 
decrease as local farmers cash out after agreeing to a long term lease and 
royalty contract. The result is less food production. Empirical evidence 
in Pennsylvania also suggests speculative landowners are less likely to 
convert agricultural land to housing subdivisions if gas extraction may 
occur in the region. Instead the land is preserved for possible use by the 
extraction industry. Thus, the local home construction industry may be 
Table 2: A Comparison of County Economic Indicators
Location 1997-2002 2002-2007
Faulkner, AR - All Industries Employment: 6.63% Employment: 2.13%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 4.49% Revenues: 5.67%
White, AR - All Industries Employment: 4.82% Employment: -0.63%
Fayetteville Shale (Began 2002) Revenues: 5.86% Revenues: 3.33%
Garland, AR - All Industries Employment: 0.58% Employment: -0.95%
No Shale Activity Revenues: 1.73% Revenues: -0.23%
Saline, AR - All Industries Employment: 0.78% Employment: 0.34%
No Shale Activity Revenues: 0.53% Revenues: 0.37%
Denton, TX - All Industries Employment: 5.44% Employment: 5.03%
Barnett Shale (began 2001) Revenues: 15.56% Revenues: -1.32%
McLennon, TX - All Industries Employment: 0.49% Employment: 0.35%
No Shale Activity Revenues: 7.64% Revenues: -1.39%
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affected. Evidence also suggests that tourism decreases with the 
emergence of the industry. Not only are overnight accommodations 
difficult to find, but the replacement of natural vistas with a patchwork of 
drilling pads, access roads, and pipelines makes the region less suitable 
for fishing, hunting, camping, and hiking. The drop in tourism dollars is 
most acute in rural counties.
A Broader Perspective on Economic Impact
From a national or global perspective, the benefits and costs associated 
with the unconventional gas extraction industry appear very different 
than at the local perspective. Local jobs and tax revenues play no role. At 
question is whether the value society places on the gas itself exceeds the 
private and external costs of extraction. If gas is valued, perhaps because 
the winter is cold or other fuels are not available, then the benefits of 
extraction are large. If the extraction process is resource intensive or if 
environmental spillovers are substantial, then the social costs may exceed 
the benefits. Damage to roads and infrastructure, nuisance to neighbors, 
cyclical economic upheaval, and climate consequences of adding fossil 
fuels contribute to the external costs. External benefits accrue if the 
extracted natural gas replaces other fossil fuels with large environmental 
costs. 
If the industry internalized all of these benefits and costs, then profit 
maximizing decisions of extractors are consistent with maximizing 
societal net benefits. A severance tax set equal to all marginal external 
costs minus all external benefits will allow for such internalization. 
Mining companies willing to pay the tax in addition to the private 
extraction costs extract gas only if that gas generates net gain to society.
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This section of the Quarterly is fully dedicated to green 
gas. We made this choice because there are currently 
many interesting developments in the green gas sec-
tor. Even though green gas only has a very marginal 
contribution to the overall energy supply in the Nether-
lands (around 30 million m3), this share is expected to 
increase significantly in the future. 
On the 6th of 2011 September Green Gas Netherlands foundation 
(GGNL) was launched to increase the production volume of green gas. 
They intend to do this by pooling knowledge and practical experience 
and to use this combination to help accelerate developments in the green 
gas sector. In addition they stimulate new projects and will propose 
solutions to existing bottlenecks. GGNL has an ambitious target of 
multiplying the total production volume of green gas by ten, from the 
current 30 to 300 million m3 (mcm). Between 2014 and 2025 they intend 
to multiply production tenfold again, from 300 mcm to 3 billion m3. 
Developments in 
the green gas sector
Figure 1: Maxime Verhagen (minister of EL&I) and Ulco Vermeulen (Chairman GGNL), 
source: GGNL 1 
This year’s Dutch stimulation grants for sustainable energy production 
(SDE+) also favoured green gas production. Of the total available 
budget of €1.5 billion, initially 50% was available for green gas 
production. Within several days the entire SDE+ budget had been 
requested by aspiring renewable energy producers. Since the system 
favoured the cheapest sustainable energy generation production, far 
more aspiring green gas producers requested subsidy than aspiring 
renewable electricity producers and more than two thirds of the requests 
were submitted by aspiring green gas producers. Based on these requests, 
the minister responsible for the SDE+, Maxime Verhagen, decided to 
change the amounts available for green gas and green electricity. Of the 
total budget, two thirds is now available for green gas production. 
Unfortunately, green gas production is still far more expensive than the 
production of natural gas. While natural gas was traded at an average of 
€0.1992 in 2010, green gas produced by co-digestion still costs around 
€0.62 per m3. In order to significantly increase green gas production, the 
production costs will have to decrease. Several developments are 
underway with the aim of lowering the production costs of green gas and 
some of them deserve to be highlighted here. 
Green gas hubs
In the Netherlands several initiatives are underway to exploit the 
potential economies of scale in upgrading biogas to natural gas quality (it 
is then called green gas), and this is accomplished by building so called 
“green gas hubs”. The first certified green gas hub is located in Tilburg3 
where Attero produces biogas from a landfill which is then upgraded to 
green gas. In addition, the biogas from a nearby wastewater treatment 
facility is upgraded at this location. In total 7 initiatives are underway in 
the Netherlands to create green gas hubs. In the contribution of Kirsten 
van Gorkum, biogas hubs are described in more detail (See “Green gas 
injection in practice from a regional grid operator point of view”). 
Decision Support Tool for investments in the gas distribution 
system
In order to accommodate green gas in the existing natural gas grid many 
investments are necessary. Investments vary from green gas hubs, biogas 
transport pipelines, connection to either the distribution or transport 
grid for natural gas, and associated compression capacity. The optimal 
choice, both from a CO2 and financial viewpoint, differ per situation. 
Taede Weijdenaar, a PhD student from the University of Twente is 
currently working on a decision support tool to aid in this decision-
making process. This tool is described in ” Development of a Decision 
Support Tool for Investments in the Gas Distribution System.” 
Valorisation of manure
The Netherlands is currently importing a large amount of feed for 
livestock, and the minerals present in the feed that is imported remain in 
the manure the animals produce. If this manure is used to produce 
biogas, these substances remain in the digestate. Both manure and 
digestate present a problem to Dutch farmers, since they are only 
allowed to apply a limited amount of these minerals on their land for 
fertilization purposes, and often the excess manure must be removed 
from the farm for fertilization application elsewhere. Both manure and 
1  http://groengas.nl/2011/09/06/oprichting-groen-gas-nederland-overgang-naar-groen-gas-begonnen/
2  http://gasterraverslag.nl/2010/nl/jaarverslag/jaarrekening_2010/Jaarrekening_2010.pdf
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Figure 2: From left to right: Ludmila Orlova, Paul van Gelder, Alexander Medvedev and Sergei 
Chenin. Source: Gasunie 6
digestate contain a lot of water, which makes transportation prohibitively 
expensive, and removal of digestate adds a considerable amount of costs 
to the production of biogas. 
In the recently published report by LTO Nederland, a vision is presented 
on how this liability can be turned into an asset4. They foresee this taking 
place in the coming years, saving greenhouse gas emissions and creating 
a market for the byproducts of biogas production. Manure and digestate 
contain valuable minerals and compounds such as potassium, nitrogen 
and phosphorus. Phosphorus is vital to world food production and is 
becoming increasingly scarce. Due to this, phosphorus in particular 
could become a very important value added product associated with 
biogas production. 
If LTO Nederland’s vision is realized this could considerably lower the 
costs of biogas production. 
In addition this would strengthen the position of green gas in the 
upcoming bio-based economy, where all biological materials will have to 
be optimally utilized.
Gasification
In order to really scale up green gas volumes, anaerobic digestion will not 
suffice. To really increase the amount of green gas production, 
gasification is required, and this technology is still under development. 
ECN, Taqa, HVC and the province of ‘Noord Holland’ will invest in a 
demonstration gasification project of 12 Megawatts. The demonstration 
project is planned to become operational in 2013, and in 2017 it is 
expected that this will be followed by a larger scale commercial gasifier 
on the order of 50 – 100 Megawatts5. 
MOU
Looking beyond the Dutch borders there are also some interesting 
developments taking place. A memorandum of understanding was 
recently signed between Gazprom, Gasunie, Eurotechnica and 
BioGazEnergostroy. In this MOU these parties announced their 
intention to cooperate in the development of green gas in Russia and to 
make the benefits of that production available to the European Union.6
According to Alexander Medvedev, the vice-chairman of Gazprom’s 
5  http://groengas.nl/projecten/groen-gashubs/overzicht-groen-gashubs/
6  http://www.lto.nl/media/default.aspx/emma/org/10760429/integrale+visie+duurzame+drijfmestverwaarding+visie+van+lto+nederland+augustus+2011.pdf
7  http://www.snvworld.org/en/ourwork/Documents/SNV%20Domestic%20Biogas%20Newsletter%20-%20issue%204%20-%20January%202011.pdf
management committee, Russia may be able to produce up to 35 billion 
cubic meters of green gas in the long run. In the last Quarterly I wrote 
about the amount of green gas that could realistically be expected in the 
near future in the Netherlands and came to the conclusion that it would 
be a relatively small contribution. If Russia were to realize their full green 
gas potential and if this green gas could be made available to the Dutch 
market, this picture would drastically change. 
As described by Geert Joosten later in this issue, international trade of 
green gas is only possible if certification of green gas between trading 
nations is sufficiently harmonized. 
Domestic biogas in developing countries
Biogas can also play an important role in developing countries. 
Organisations such as Hivos and SNV are implementing large scale 
domestic biogas programs in developing countries. 
In Asia and Africa small scale biogas installations are providing 
renewable energy to rural households. Biomass is often freely available to 
rural households in the form of manure, whereas fuel for cooking is often 
absent or comes at a relatively high cost. Since the average ambient 
temperature in these regions is higher than in Europe, no additional heat 
is required to keep the digestion process going, and no expensive and 
complex technology is required. While biogas production in the 
Netherlands still requires subsidies, the decision to invest in a domestic 
biogas installation will yield an IRR of over 50% for a Tanzanian 
household. Besides providing cooking fuel, biogas can also provide light 
in the form of a very simple gas lamp, thereby extending the day in case 
an electricity grid is not present.
If biogas replaces fuelwood, the cleaner burning biogas prevents 
respiratory problems for both women and children (the women often 
work in poorly ventilated kitchens while looking after their children). 
The presence of a biogas installation also improves sanitary conditions, 
and the impact is even larger if the household’s toilet is connected to the 
biogas installation. Finally, for many crops, it turns out that digested 
manure results in a higher yield, increased crop prices and less need for 
the addition of chemical fertilizer and pesticides. 
The benefits of domestic biogas installations are widely recognized in 
countries such as Vietnam where almost 25 000 biogas plants have been 
installed in 20107. 
Despite the high potential returns after investing in a domestic biogas 
installation, the (relatively small) investment in a domestic biogas 
installation is often problematic due to a lack of financing options 
available to rural households. 
Dutch utilities are in a good position to create a win-win situation. As 
long as national green gas production is insufficient to deliver green gas 
to households which would be willing to pay a premium for CO2 neutral 
natural gas, this gas consumption could be compensated by enabling 
biogas production in developing countries. The biogas would not have to 
be physically delivered to the Dutch households, but a certification 
system would be required in order to ensure that the biogas is actually 
produced in developing countries, thereby displacing fossil fuel and 
preventing methane emissions from manure storage. Next to providing 
customers with affordable, CO2 neutral natural gas, this would improve 
the livelihoods of poor farmers in developing countries. 
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Manure, sewage, waste in landfills, organic waste, 
and other types of biomass can all be used to produce 
biogas. Biogas is produced in many different places 
in the Netherlands and throughout the world. This 
gas is usually converted directly into electricity with 
combined heat and power plants (bio-CHP), unfor-
tunately in most cases the generated heat has no useful 
application. For optimal and sustainable utilization of 
the biogas it must be transported to locations where the 
full energy of the gas can be utilized. 
As the Netherlands has one of the most-effective natural gas grids in the 
world, this grid could also be utilized to transport biogas upgraded to 
natural gas quality. 
Upgraded biogas is injected into the Enexis grid at 5 locations: Wijster, 
Tilburg, Groningen, Well and Witteveen. This biogas is produced from 
both organic material in landfills and organic waste, which has been 
collected separately. Crude biogas must be upgraded to natural gas 
quality before it is injected in the natural gas grid and when the gas is 
upgraded to natural gas quality, it is called green gas. The production of 
renewable energy is a hot topic today. Based on its mission to facilitate 
the energy transition, grid operator Enexis is working hard to simplify 
the injection of green gas in the gas grid.
Green gas and the gas grid
Upgrading crude biogas to natural gas quality guarantees the safety and 
integrity of the grid and end-users equipment. Green gas, renewable gas 
upgraded to natural gas quality, must therefore meet the ‘Additional 
requirements for green gas injection into the regional gas grid,’ a set of 
requirements developed by the collective of Dutch grid operators 
together with biogas producers. This is done to safeguard the interests of 
both producers and consumers of natural gas in The Netherlands. 
The Dutch natural gas grid is designed to provide gas from a central 
location (e.g. the gas field of Slochteren) to the end-users. This means 
that the amount of gas that needs to be injected depends on the amount 
of gas consumed at the end of the grid. Next to the gas quality 
requirements sufficient consumption on that part of the grid is necessary 
to inject green gas. The presence of a pipeline connection to the grid 
from a biogas plant with green gas does not “automatically” lead to 
smooth injection. The amount of green gas which can be injected into 
the grid equals the amount of gas that is consumed by the end-users 
connected to that part of the grid.
In the Netherlands most of the green gas is produced in rural areas which 
are not densely populated. This means few customers and a limited 
amount of gas consumption. Especially in summer, the demand for gas is 
low, since gas is mostly used for heating houses. It is often in summer 
that there is a mismatch between the demand and supply side. Priority 
for green gas cannot be compared with priority for renewable electricity. 
Where electricity producers can be switched off to create space for green 
electricity producers, for gas the question whether green gas can be 
injected depends on the demand by end-users.
Green gas injection in practice 
from a regional grid operator 
point of view
How to increase injection possibilities? 
The future is one with sustainable energy supply. In this future the role 
for green gas is identified by Enexis. Multiple solutions are currently 
being explored by Enexis in order to increase possibilities for green gas 
injection and to break through the supply-demand mismatch. 
1 Longer connection pipelines to a grid with a sufficient gas 
consumption
2 Back-feeding of the surplus gas into the national grid (higher pressure)
3 Collection pipeline with central upgrading (biogas hubs) 
In Zwolle Enexis cooperated with the national grid operator GTS in a 
pilot project called ‘Natuurgas Overijssel’, (a joint venture of the waste 
processors ROVA and HVC). An 8-bar connection pipeline connects the 
production site to a compressor from which the connection is made to 
the 40-bar grid of the national grid operator GTS. The party that injects 
the green gas in the grid carries the costs of the connection pipeline and 
the compression of the gas. Since these costs are relatively high, a long 
connection pipeline is not usually a viable option for smaller biogas 
producers when faced with capacity problems.
Currently a study is being performed concerning back-feeding surplus 
gas to the national grid which is operated at a higher pressure. In 
summertime or when more producers request a connection to the 
regional grid and gas consumption is lacking, a large compressor feeds 
the excess gas from the regional grid (8 bar) back into the national grid 
(40 bar). In order to use as little energy as possible, discussions are 
taking place between the regional and national grid operator to operate 
the national grid at a lower pressure during summertime, when smaller 
volumes need to be transported. Even though discussions concerning 
responsibilities and financial models are still taking place, Enexis is 
working on a back-feeding pilot in Groningen to learn more about the 
technical possibilities and operational issues in practice. 
The third category of ‘increasing injection possibilities’ are also put in 
practice by Enexis. In the northeastern part of Friesland, in Wijster and 
the area of Salland, biogas hubs are being developed. In rural areas, 
transporting the biogas to a central location - a biogas hub – seems to be 
an obvious solution. Several producers inject biogas into a central 
pipeline which transports the gas to either an industrial consumer or an 
upgrading facility that upgrades the biogas to green gas quality for 
injection into the natural gas grid. Upgrading biogas to green gas is a very 
costly process. For smaller projects it is almost impossible to create a 
viable business case since the upgrading facilities that are required to 
produce green gas require large investments. A biogas hub may offer a 
solution here. 
In order to secure the safety of the maintenance engineers and the direct 
surroundings of the upgrading facility, safety requirements are set. This 
means that raw biogas cannot freely be transported through a biogas 
pipeline and not just any pipeline can become a biogas pipeline. In order 
to be transported safely it has to meet to the specifications that have been 
set for biogas. The biogas must meet the maximum water dew-point and 
components like water sulphate and ammonia must be limited. A biogas 
hub is more than the technical engineering of an infrastructure. 
Commitment of local-, regional- and national government, producers, 
financing parties and grid operators is necessary next to the willingness 
Kirsten van Gorkum
Innovator Biogas Enexis
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to invest in a concept of which the risks – both commercial and technical 
– are not all visible. The project in the North-Eastern par of Friesland is 
unique as the upgraded green gas, 6500 m3/h, will be injected in the 
national grid (40bar). Enexis and Stedin have taken care of the basic 
engineering, the permits and licenses and will invest in the biogas hub. 
Producers are willing to commit themselves to the project and are 
waiting for the necessary subsidies from the Dutch government (SDE+), 
as without subsidy this project would not yet be financially feasible. The 
biogas hub in Wijster has received part of the required subsidies and the 
Salland biogas hub is still in the development phase. For the 
development of a biogas hub many parties, sometimes competitors, must 
all work together. 
Biogas hubs and pipelines 
Biogas as such is not covered in the Dutch Gas law, nor is a European or 
national norm formulated regarding the operation and management of a 
biogas pipeline. In the present situation biogas pipelines and hubs can be 
developed by any commercial party. Even though it concerns a 
free-market activity, in practice few are in development and the ones that 
are progress slowly.
Enexis could perform a vital role in providing biogas infrastructure 
activities for two reasons. (1) The fact that the activities are not adopted 
by the commercial market and (2) because of its impecable track record 
in safe and reliable gas transportation and distribution. Finally, it is very 
likely that the regional grid operator will be approached in case of 
failures and leaks of a pipeline with a gas-like-substance and where safety 
must be served. For these reasons, Enexis advocates that construction 
and maintenance of biogas infrastructure should become one of their 
statutory duties.
Conclusion
The most suitable solutions for the sustainable use of biogas depend on 
the location and specific situation. In close cooperation with market 
participants Enexis will assess the optimal solution for each specific case. 
This cooperation goes further than the statutory duties in order to 
address the challenges arising from the transition to a more sustainable 
energy supply.
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Introduction
It is expected that the share of bio-methane in the Dutch gas supply mix 
will increase significantly in the next decade – from the current 0.1% to 
12% in 2020. The bio-methane supply chain is shown in Figure 1. In the 
first step, the biomass is produced and subsequently transported to the 
digester installation – the biomass consists of manure and a co-substrate, 
e.g. maize. In the study presented in this article, biomass is supplied by 
farmers. The digestion process produces biogas consisting of 50-65% 
methane – for comparison Dutch natural gas consists of 83% methane. 
In the subsequent step, upgrading, unwanted components are removed 
and the methane content is increased, in order to obtain a gas with 
burning properties similar to that of natural gas.
 
Figure 1: Bio-methane supply chain [3]
Due to the small scale of bio-methane installations, it is economically 
not efficient to inject the bio-methane in the national transport grid. 
Therefore, the bio-methane is likely to be injected in the gas distribution 
grid. The gas distribution grid is traditionally not used as a feed-in point 
for produced gas, and the injection of bio-methane in the gas distri-
bution grid leads to several challenges. Among others, the gas demand in 
the distribution grid may not be sufficient to take up all the bio-methane 
produced, especially in the summer when gas demand is at its lowest. 
Furthermore, if one or more farmers want to use their biomass to 
produce bio-methane, it should be investigated how and where each step 
of the bio-methane supply chain takes place. One option is to perform 
each step of the supply chain at the farm site for each individual farmer. 
However, the digestion and upgrading equipment is expensive. It might 
therefore be beneficial to share the investment of, for instance, an 
upgrading plant with several farmers and consequently lowering the 
investment costs for the upgrading plant per farmer. Though investment 
costs for the upgrading plant are lowered in this way, it also incurs extra 
costs, since a pipeline has to be laid to transport the biogas from the 
digester to the upgrading plant – or in case a digester is shared, the 
farmer should transport the biomass to the digester. Hence, a trade-off 
has to be made between these different costs [1]. 
The preferred configuration is largely dependent on the specific 
situation, and therefore the choice regarding the best option varies from 
situation to situation. Therefore, we are developing a Decision Support 
Tool (DST) that gives location specific advice regarding investments in 
bio-methane projects.
In this article, we present the prototype of the eventual DST we are 
developing. By means of a case study[2], we explain the basics of the 
DST. In the case study several farmers in the vicinity of the city of 
Zutphen would like to use their biomass to produce bio-methane. 
The produced bio-methane will be injected in the natural gas grid of 
Zutphen.
Development of a Decision Support 
Tool for Investments in the Gas 
Distribution System
The case study 
Figure 2 shows the layout of the 8 bar grid of Zutphen. The blue arcs 
indicate the pipelines, and the blue squares indicate the district stations, 
which in this model are considered to be the gas consumers. In the 
vicinity of Zutphen there are several farmers with biomass available for 
bio-methane production, they are indicated with black plusses. The 8 bar 
grid, the gas consumers, the farm locations, and the biomass availability 
for each farm are loaded into the DST. 
Figure 2: 8 bar grid of Zutphen and the farms with biomass available for bio-methane 
production 
Once all the data is loaded into the DST, it starts to explore a great 
number of potential solutions to utilize the biomass. The solution should 
preferably minimize the yearly costs and maximize the CO2 reduction 
achieved by replacing natural gas by bio-methane. For this step, the DST 
uses building blocks to generate solutions. The building blocks the DST 
uses are:
•	 Truck:	To	transport	the	biomass	from	the	farm	to	the	digester	station	
in case the biomass is not digested at the farm site
•	 Pipelines:	To	transport	biogas	from	the	digester	to	the	upgrading	plant	
in case these two steps are not performed at the same location
•	 Digester	station:	Converts	biomass	into	biogas	that	contains	57%	
methane
•	 Upgrading	plant:	Converts	biogas	into	bio-methane,	i.e.	natural	gas	
quality
•	 Injection	station:	Compresses	the	gas	to	8	or	40	bar	and	by	means	of	a	
pipeline feeds the bio-methane in the 8 bar grid, or the gas receiving 
station (connected to the 40 bar grid) respectively 
The DST places and scales the building blocks when generating potential 
solutions. 
For this study, 10.000 possible solutions were generated. For each 
solution, the yearly costs and the yearly CO2 emission reduction were 
determined. Among the 10.000 solutions there is not a single solution 
that optimizes both performance indicators. However, several solutions 
can be considered “pareto optimal”; a pareto optimal solution is a 
solution for which there cannot be found another solution with a better 
performance indicator without deteriorating the other performance 
indicator. Figure 3 shows the set of pareto optimal solutions derived 
Taede Weidenaar
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Figure 3: Performance indicators of the pareto optimal solutions
To illustrate what kind of solutions the DST generates, Figure 4 shows 
one of the solutions that is pareto optimal. As can be seen, in this 
solution, sometimes the biomass is transported by truck – which is 
indicated by a dashed green line – to a digester further away. For 
instance, the biomass from the farm in the top left of the figure is 
transported to the neighbouring farm where a digester installation is 
located. The biogas produced at this location is transported by a biogas 
pipeline – indicated with a red line – to a central upgrading plant – 
yellow circle. In this configuration, one upgrading plant is shared by all 
the farmers. At the location of the upgrading plant, the gas is also 
compressed to the appropriate operating pressure in the injection station 
– magenta square – and subsequently injected in the 8 bar grid of 
Zutphen. 
Lessons learned
The case study showed that the DST is a useful tool to provide insight in 
the available investment options. Once the starting configuration is 
loaded into the DST, it generates a multitude of solutions. The plots 
easily shows how each solution performs compared to the others. Hence, 
the tool promises to be of great added value to the Distribution Service 
Operators (DSOs).
In order to increase the added value of the DST for the DSOs, it needs 
some further improvements. First of all, a number of performance 
indicators will be added to increase insight into the available solution 
space; among others, we will add yearly green gas volume produced, 
investments required in the gas grid, and the energy balance for each 
solution. Secondly, the user interaction of the tool should be significantly 
improved.
Figure 4: Example of a generated solution
Concluding remarks
The developed prototype is a first step towards a DST which will have 
more functionality. In the eventual DST we will incorporate different 
types of foreign gas. Furthermore, interaction between the electricity 
grid and the gas distribution grid – e.g. the injection of hydrogen in the 
gas grid to buffer the fluctuating energy supply of solar PVs and 
windmills – will be incorporated.
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from the total set of 10.000 solutions. It can be seen that reducing more 
CO2 on a yearly basis leads to higher yearly costs. Therefore, when 
deciding on the preferred solution, a trade-off has to be made between 
yearly costs and yearly CO2 emission reduction.
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Most of the biogas produced in the Netherlands is used 
to produce green electricity, however the waste heat of 
the gas engine often cannot be used effectively because 
of the remote location of the production sites. In that 
case the overall energy efficiency of the production 
chain is very low. When the biogas is treated to a gas 
quality that can be fed into the public gas grid (it then 
is called green gas) the overall energy efficiency is con-
siderably higher. This has been rewarded in the Dutch 
SDE+ subsidy and biogas producers have shown an 
keen interest in the production of green gas under this 
scheme. If all projects awarded in 2011 are realised the 
yearly production volume of green gas would increase 
by more than 195 MCM.
Feeding green gas into the grid dramatically increases the number of 
potential customers : all companies and private persons connected to the 
grid. However, after being fed into the grid, green gas mingles with the 
fossil gas and cannot be distinguished from it. To be able to trade and sell 
green gas it is essential to have a certification system. In this system a 
certificate is issued for each MWh of green gas that has been fed into the 
grid. The sale of green gas takes place by delivering (mainly fossil) gas 
from the grid plus the corresponding number of certificates. There need 
not be a physical connection between the points of injection and 
consumption other than that they both are connected to the public gas 
grid. The certificates guarantee the green origin of the gas.
It is clear that the trust market parties have in the certificate system 
hinges on the reliability of the certificate’s issuing body. Customers must 
not have any doubts whatsoever regarding such questions as: was the 
green gas actually fed into the grid, was the gas actually of a green origin, 
can no double counting of certificates take place etc.
In the Netherlands Gasunie has founded a certificate Issuing Body (IB), 
Vertogas. Vertogas takes all possible measures to guarantee the validity of 
the certificates. Examples of these measures include the strict application 
of rules to the accuracy of the energy metering, that each certificate is 
uniquely numbered, that it states the identity of the production site, the 
date of production, the nature and origin of the feed that was used to 
produce the green gas, whether subsidy was received in the production 
process etc. 
The practical operation of the system is as follows. A producer of green 
gas asks Vertogas to register his installation. Vertogas then carries out a 
physical inspection of the plant and an audit of the procedures for 
production and transfer of the necessary information to Vertogas during 
the operation phase of the plant. After approval by Vertogas the producer 
can start to feed green gas into the grid. He chooses a trader to which he 
sells the green gas. The trader receives a certificate for each MWh of 
green gas fed into the grid. The metering of the number of MWh is 
carried out by an independent metering company. The latter transfers the 
metering data to Vertogas. Vertogas keeps a kind of “bank account” of 
certificates for each trader. A trader can sell his certificates to another 
Certification of Green Gas
trader. They inform Vertogas of the deal and the certificates are 
transferred to the account of the new owner of the certificates. Of course 
the trader can also sell green gas to an end consumer. When doing so 
Vertogas cancels the corresponding number of certificates from the 
trader’s account. 
At present not all gas labelled green is traded via the Vertogas 
certification system. This is confusing for the customers and may be 
detrimental to the public’s trust in green gas. It is a positive development 
that minister Verhagen recently announced that Vertogas will be given a 
legal status in the near future. 
In the Netherlands there is no certification system for biogas as such. 
This is a pity because the direct use of biogas, for example for heating, is 
an economical way of using the energy released from biomass. Hardly 
any treatment of the biogas and compression needs to take place, so 
avoiding considerable costs. This results in a low price per MWh. 
The users of biogas may want to claim the green nature of the biogas. In 
that case the certificates are cancelled when the gas is used. Via the IB 
the user can prove that he has burned gas from a renewable source. 
Alternatively, the user may not desire to use the green claim himself, but 
want to sell the green value of the biogas to somebody else. This is 
possible via the certificates. 
We recommend that a study is carried out investigating whether and 
under what conditions a biogas certification scheme can be set up in 
parallel to the green gas certificate system. Requirements for the 
protocols of certification should be defined. 
Another possible step is the international trade of green gas. Certain 
countries, e.g. Germany, have a high production level. The demand for 
green gas may be large in other countries, creating an interesting market 
for green gas abroad. It is clear that this international trade will take place 
via certificates: the certificates are traded, rather than the physical gas. 
The trade of certificates should go via the Issuing Bodies in both 
countries. The traders in the exporting and importing country inform 
their IB that a trade has been arranged, and the national IB of the 
exporting country then cancels the corresponding number of certificates. 
Finally, the IB in the importing country generates new ones in his 
national system for the importing trader.
Essential in this scheme is that the certificates in both countries are 
representing the same green properties of the gas, i.e. they are 
interchangeable. The simplest way to realise this is by having identical 
rules for green gas in both countries. At present rules vary across Europe. 
This need not rule out the possibility of international trade, provided the 
essential rules are identical. To arrange this bilaterally between countries 
is probably easier than for the whole of Europe, especially as the 
Renewable Energy Directive does not apply to green gas. A good start 
may be to enable trade of green certificates between Germany and the 
Netherlands. Once up and running more countries may join the scheme. 
A positive development in this respect is that Vertogas and DENA in 
Germany are discussing these kinds of possibilities. The same holds for 
the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Gasunie and 
Gazprom plus Biogazenergostroy in Russia. They will study the 
possibility to export Russian green gas (certificates) to the Netherlands.
There are interesting times to come for green gas. 
Geert Joosten
Senior Expert, Energy Delta Insitute
Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2011. Breaking new 
ground: A special report on global shale gas developments. 
The Economist. 
Worries about climate change are deepening in many countries. 
Proponents of gas, which burns cleaner than coal, suggest that it could be 
part of the answer—but preferably indigenous gas, for the sake of energy 
security. At the same time, even as energy demand surges ahead, the 
giants of the oil industry are finding it harder than ever to tap new 
reserves, which is forcing them to look to previously neglected, 
harder-to-reach hydrocarbons. Among these, previously disregarded 
shale gas reserves are generating the most enthusiasm. The groundwork 
for this has been a remarkable upswing of activity in the US, where over 
the past decade innovative techniques have propelled shale gas from 
irrelevance to a position where it now makes up one-quarter of all natural 
gas production. And although the shale gas story has been 
overwhelmingly a US one to date, the search for shale is accelerating 
around the world. This special report brings together a collection of 
recent articles looking at fledgling shale gas developments worldwide, 
with a focus on the countries thought to hold the largest reserves.
This report is available at: http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.
aspx?campaignid=shalegas
International Energy Agency, November 2011. World Energy 
Outlook 2011. 
The World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2011 brings together the latest data, 
policy developments, and experience of another year to provide robust 
analysis and insight into global energy markets, today and for the next 25 
years. This edition of WEO gives the latest energy demand and supply 
projections for different future scenarios, broken down by country, fuel 
and sector. It also gives special focus to such energy sector issues as: 1) 
Russia’s energy prospects and their implications for global markets; 2) 
the role of coal in driving economic growth in an emissions-constrained 
world; 3) the implications of a possible delay in oil and gas sector 
investment in the Middle East and North Africa; 4) how high-carbon 
infrastructure “lock-in” is making the 2°C climate change goal more 
challenging and expensive to meet; 5) the scale of fossil fuel subsidies 
and support for renewable energy and their impact on energy, economic 
and environmental trends; 6) a “Low Nuclear Case” to investigate what a 
rapid slowdown in the use of nuclear power would mean for the global 
energy landscape, and 7) the scale and type of investment needed to 
provide modern energy to the billions of the world’s poor that do not 
have it. 
This book is available at: http://www.iea.org/w/bookshop/add.
aspx?id=428
Katja Yafimava, November 2011. The Transit Dimension of EU 
Energy Security: Russian gas transit across Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
This is the first book to provide an in-depth analysis of market, legal/
regulatory, and energy security aspects of the transit of Russian gas to 
Europe across western CIS countries – Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova 
– to Europe. The book analyses how EU transit, and hence energy, 
security is affected by the governance structures of the Eurasian gas 
network and by asymmetrical power relations between its actors, in 
particular between Russia and western CIS states and their national gas 
companies. The book views the Eurasian gas network as the overlap and 
interaction of four spaces: the regulatory space, the contractual space, the 
space of flows, and the space of places. It concludes that discontinuities 
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between and within the spaces adversely affect EU gas transit security, 
and suggests ways of reducing these discontinuities and minimizing their 
negative effects. Threats to the security of Russian gas transit across 
western CIS countries are identified, and reasons for unresolved Russia–
western CIS bilateral issues which led to the appearance of these threats 
are explained, as are reasons why existing bilateral frameworks (supply 
and transit contracts and intergovernmental agreements) proved 
inadequate to ensure security of transit. EU energy policy gaps are 
identified, and the reasons which reduced the Union’s ability to deal with 
such threats, and the ways in which transit security could be 
incorporated into the existing policy frameworks, are explained. The 
book shows how multilateral frameworks (the Energy Charter Treaty 
and the Energy Community Treaty) could contribute towards increased 
security of transit, and how transit security threats can be reduced 
through the joint employment of bilateral and multilateral frameworks.
This book is available at: 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/shop/the-transit-dimension-of-eu-
energy-security-russian-gas-transit-across-ukraine-belarus-and-moldova
James Henderson, November 2011. Domestic Gas Prices in 
Russia – Towards Export Netback? The Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies.
The paper by James Henderson examines the domestic gas price 
developments in Russia and the progress that has been made towards the 
target set by Vladimir Putin for regulated gas prices to reach parity with 
the European export netback price by 2011. The first sections of the 
paper give a brief history of gas prices in Russia in the post-Soviet era 
from 1991 to 2006 and discuss the introduction of the netback parity 
target together with its implications for the Russian gas sector. Following 
sections discuss the current state of the debate on domestic gas prices 
and examine the implications of reaching a netback parity target by 2015. 
The last two sections of this paper examine the impact of a number of 
factors on domestic gas prices, including gas sector reform in Europe, 
electricity sector reform in Russia and the ongoing diversification of a 
number of gas producers into the power sector, the improving 
economics of Russian gas production as the importance of non-
Gazprom producers grow, and many others. This paper concludes that 
Russian domestic gas prices are not likely to reach European netback 
levels any time soon, but that the momentum of the past five years 
towards significantly higher domestic prices will continue, leading to an 
eventual liberalization of the Russian gas market. Over the next decade, 
this could create fundamental changes in Russia’s relationship with 
European gas markets with potential competition for available supplies 
between domestic and European export markets.
This paper is available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2011/11/NG_57.pdf
David Buchan, October 2011. Expanding the European 
dimension in energy policy: the Commission’s latest initiatives. 
The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
This paper relates to events taking place at the European level to help the 
European Union towards its ambitious 2020 energy and climate goals. 
Specifically, this paper tracks the European Commissions’ initiatives in 
2011 to streamline national planning approval of vital energy 
infrastructure, to use EU funds to leverage more private finance for 
energy projects, and to lend some reality to a common external energy 
policy though Commission-led negotiations with foreign energy 
suppliers on international infrastructure. This paper analyses the 
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problems that the Commission initiatives seek to resolve, since these 
initiatives awkwardly coincide with the eurozone crisis. David Buchan 
broadly endorses Brussels’ attempt to kick-start implementation of 
Europe’s 2020 energy and climate goals. He suggests the Commission go 
a step further by taking advantage of the forthcoming treaty revision to 
propose a constitutional amendment on EU states’ energy mix.
The paper is available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2011/10/SP_23.pdf
WWF and Ecofys, December 2011. EU Climate Policy Tracker 
2011. 
Limiting the rise in the average global temperature to 2°C has been the 
EU goal since 1996, and in December 2010 the UN recognised the need 
to consider a 1.5°C limit. Avoiding overshooting these levels will require 
massive emissions reductions – in the order of 80-95% for industrialized 
countries, such as those in the EU. The next ten years are crucial in 
establishing whether society will be able to make this transition, or 
whether temperature increase limits will be irreversibly missed. 
Last year, the European Union Climate Policy Tracker (EU CPT) 
investigated each member state’s implementation of policy and 
legislation, and rated their progress towards a 2050 vision of deep 
decarbonisation using renewable energy. The uniquely developed rating 
scheme, modelled on appliance efficiency labels (A-G, where G is the 
lowest score), gave an indication of how member states were doing 
compared to a ‘low-carbon policy package’. The average score was an ‘E’, 
indicating that the level of effort needed to treble, to be on a pace to 
reach the 2050 vision. 
This report builds on last year’s EU CPT by giving an update on action 
in member states, and an indicative trend in the rating, as well as adding 
a new section on EU policy. The overall conclusion of this report is that 
current efforts in Europe still remain insufficient to meet a low-carbon 
vision. 
This report is available at: http://www.climatepolicytracker.eu/
Ahmad Faruqui & Doug Mitarotonda, November 2011. Energy 
Efficiency and Demand Response in 2020 – 
A Survey of Expert Opinion. The Brattle Group.
Compared to the European Union, which has a definite target for energy 
efficiency improvement by 2020, the US as a whole does not yet have 
any similar targets. Nevertheless, some states such as Connecticut, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania have established specific numerical targets 
while others, such as California, have made energy efficiency and 
demand response part of their energy action plan. 
The Brattle Group in cooperation with Global Energy Partners has 
recently carried out a survey with the central question of “what is the 
likely impact of energy efficiency and demand response going to be on 
customer usage by the year 2020?” Almost 200 experts in the US and 
Canada participated in this survey, representing various facets of the 
industry – from academics to consultants, utilities to regulators and 
consumer to environmental NGOs. The overall observation of this 
survey was the following: “the experts expect that US electric 
consumption will decline by between 5 and 15 percent by the year 2020, 
compared to what it would have been in the absence of additional energy 
efficiency measures. Concerning natural gas consumption, this savings 
are in the range of 5 to 10 percent, compared to what is would have been 
otherwise”. 
All results of this survey are available at: http://www.brattle.com/_
documents/UploadLibrary/Upload990.pdf
IEA World Energy Outlook 2011 in the Hague
After an introduction of Maria van der Hoeven (chairmen IEA, former 
Dutch minister of Economic Affairs), Fatih Birol (Chief Economist of 
IEA) presented the most interesting findings:
Gas will be the ‘lucky’ fuel. It is the cleanest of the fossil fuels and is 
relatively abundant, accessible and cheap. It is becoming more attractive 
in light of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima and the resulting global 
disinterest in nuclear energy and because of China’s plan to focus on 
natural gas to meet increasing energy demand. Gas is lucky, because it 
will benefit as the default fuel. According to Birol, the next age could be a 
golden one for natural gas on the condition that the industry does 
everything in their power to extract natural gas (conventional and shale) 
in a sustainable and clean manner. Only if the industry will apply best 
practice in regards to the environment (at 10-15% higher cost), than 
unconventional gas has an important future in Europe especially.
Coal on the other hand, is the ‘forgotten’ fuel. On conferences and 
energy events much is said about oil, gas, nuclear and renewables, but 
not about coal despite the fact that it makes up 50% of global power 
production. The share of coal used for power production will continue to 
be large due to the demand of developing countries, such as China and 
India.
The phase-out of nuclear in some countries and the decreased activity in 
others is undesirable from both an environmental (more emission of 
CO2 associated with fossil fuels) and an energy supply (energy supply is 
less diversified) perspective.
Some 50% of global efforts to reduce climate change must come from 
improved energy efficiency and the largest improvements can be made in 
countries such as Russia.
The window of opportunity to act together against climate change to put 
the world on a path leading to a temperature increase of 2 degrees 
Celsius is closing fast. The world is 80% locked in on a path that leads to 
a larger temperature increase. By the end of 2017, this certainty will be 
100%, and all opportunity to get on a 2-degree path will be lost.
Symposium ‘Energie in 2030’ 
The first debate during this symposium dealt with real energy savings 
and related issues. The saving of energy results in lower energy bills on 
the household level. However, we tend to invest the saved money in 
other energy-consuming products and services. The discussion focused 
on the manner in which real energy savings can be achieved in the light 
of this reality. 
The next discussion was about ‘Obtaining insight into sustainability and 
focused on the absence of a certification scheme in the energy sector. In 
this regard, a certificate implies that the whole production process of 
energy (it applies to the complete chain) meets certain standards. To 
introduce such a scheme, the government should take the initiative 
because companies do not really have an incentive to introduce such a 
scheme themselves, according to the debaters.
The subject of the third discussion round was ‘between scarcity and 
abundance’. It concerned the relationship between renewable sources of 
energy, their implementation on shore, fossil sources of energy, their 
continuous use and resulting (climate) problems in the future and, more 
in general, what must be yielded in financial, environmental and spatial 
terms.
The final debate was called ‘Towards a new model of earning money with 
energy in 2030’ and dealt with the choices that must be made right now 
in order to make money with energy in 2030. At this time point it is 
expected that fossil fuels, natural gas in general will still play a dominant 
role in the energy mix, next to the increased penetration of renewables.
Conference Notes
Eurogas Annual Conference
The day started with an opening word after which Laurent David (GDF 
Suez) presented the Eurogas Roadmap 2050. During the subsequent 
discussion, it became clear that companies and institutions (IEA, 
GasTerra, GDF Suez, WWF) see a prominent role for natural gas in the 
future energy supply to reduce emissions until 2030. Following this, 
there was a discussion about attracting investment in the European 
internal market. It appeared that the regulatory framework supporting 
the market is very uncertain, according to Domenico Dispenza (ENI), 
which makes investment difficult. Next to this, the future natural gas 
market will be characterized by a combination of long-term contracting 
(only if it leads to a better functioning of the internal market) and spot 
pricing, the EC stated. 
Next, Fabrizio Barbaso (EC) gave an overview of the EU’s future 
external energy policy. During the subsequent discussion it became clear 
that the EU external energy policy is focussing on the governmental level 
and not the company level. The goal is a better functioning of the internal 
market and to achieve this, a better grip is needed on intergovernmental 
agreements. The final speech of the day was held by Philipe Lowe. He 
talked about the completion of the European internal energy market in 
2014 and the further steps that must be taken to better the functioning of 
the internal market, such as to further implement the 3rd Energy 
Package, harmonising market and network operating rules and 
enhancing investments in infrastructure.
Hamburg Intelligent Cities Expo
The first day at the Intelligent Cities Conference Hamburg focussed on 
the smart city pilot programs already in operation and projects that are in 
development. The main message that was conveyed in all presentations is 
that Smart City and Smart Grid projects are a joint effort between 
several parties. No single organisation or company is able to implement 
this alone, beneficial cooperation is the main solution. Additionally, 
Simon Giles of Accenture emphasized that the added value of smart 
grids must be made apparent to all stakeholders in order to ensure their 
adoption. 
The second day of the Expo was devoted to governance issues 
surrounding intelligent cities. Andreas Hermelink of Ecofys emphasized 
that net-zero energy buildings need to compensate for others that cannot 
be renovated sufficiently or cost effectively, such as historic, protected 
buildings. Richard Bellingham from the University of Strathclyde 
underscored the fact that cities must be designed in a resilient matter in 
order to cope with socioeconomic change. 
The third and final day of the Expo discussed intelligent mobility. Here, 
Peter Lindlahr of Hysolutions discussed the changes in mobility implied 
by social changes, such as the fact that newer generations are less 
dedicated to the personal automobile. Generally, an emphasis was placed 
on the examination of cities as an integrated space in order to achieve the 
maximum level of integration and efficiency among the various modes of 
transport and activities taking place. The success of congestion charges 
was demonstrated by various examples, and the need to examine new 
sources of revenue (due to the fact that less income will be generated 
from road taxation) was discussed. Finally, a overarching theme present 
throughout the conference was the importance of politicians 
communicating to the public that significant increases in the prices of 
energy are expected in the future, something that is not currently taking 
place to a large enough extent.  
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Conferences 2012
January
January 23-25: Berlin, Germany
Gas to Power Europe Forum
www.gastopowereurope.com/ 
January 23-25: West Sussex, UK
EU and UK Gas Security of Supply
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/en/conferences/policy-programmes/
european-union-and-its-neighbours/?view=Conference&id=592573782 
January 24-27: Vienna, Austria
European Gas Conference 2012
http://www.theenergyexchange.co.uk/european-gas-conference-
2012/s13/a214/ 
January 25-26: London, UK
Esco Europe
www.esco-europe.com
January 26-27: Berlin, Germany
Gas Transport & Storage Summit 2012
http://www.gtsevent.com/ 
January 31-February 1: Brussels, Belgium
EU Energy Law & Policy, 7th Annual Conference
http://www.euenergyconference.com/ 
February
February 1-2: London, UK
Gas to Power
www.smi-online.co.uk/events/overview.asp?is=5&ref=3851 
February 6-8: Istanbul, Turkey
EMEA Unconventional Gas Exploration and Production Forum
http://www.cvent.com/events/unconventional-gas-exploration-and-
production/event-summary-dff2d29a930f45a783f78363f130a8dd.aspx 
February 7-9: Essen, Germany
E-World Energy & Water 2012
http://www.e-world-2012.com/en/congress/programme/ 
February 8: London, UK
Carbon Capture & Storage Forum
http://marketforce.eu.com/Conferences/ccs12/?utm_source=www.
euagenda.eu&utm_medium=event_calendar&utm_campaign=ccs12 
February 8-10: Marseille, France
Global Energy Forum
oilgas.flemingeurope.com/global-lng-forum/
February 29 – March 2: Wels, Austria
World Sustainable Energy Days
www.wsed.at/en/programme/ 
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March
March 6-7: Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Carbon Market Insights
www.pointcarbon.com/events/conferences/cmi2012/ 
March 6-8: Berlin, Germany
European Gas Market Forum
http://www.cvent.com/events/european-gas-market-forum/event-
summary-17f06992f6584036baac7adc4f18bc7c.aspx 
March 13-14: Düsseldorf, Germany
Energy Storage
http://www.energy-storage-online.de/ 
March 13-14: Barcelona, Spain
Unconventional Gas Forum 2012
http://www.ug-forum.com/ 
March 13-15: Rotterdam, the Netherlands
World Biofuels Markets 2012
www.worldbiofuelsmarkets.com/EF/?sSubSystem=Prospectus&
sEventCode=BF1203NL 
March 21-22: Oslo, Norway
European LNG Forum
http://www.lngjournal.com/lng/index.php?option=com_k2&view=
item&layout=item&id=2057&Itemid=157 
March 26-28: Moscow, Russia
Russia 2012 Offshore 7th Annual Conference & Exhibition
http://www.theenergyexchange.co.uk/russia-offshore-2012-7th-annual-
meeting/s13/a244/ 
March 26-29: Warsaw, Poland
Unconventional Gas & Oil Summit
http://www.informaglobalevents.com/event/unconventionals/
Accomodation 
March 26-29: London, UK
Smart Energy Management
http://www.terrapinn.com/2012/smart-energy-management-world-
europe/ 
March 27-29: Marcliffe, Aberdeen, UK
Oil & Gas Outlook North Sea
http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-
services/upcoming-conferences-and-seminars 
March 29: London, UK
The Smart Utility Forum
http://marketforce.eu.com/Conferences/smartutility12/ 
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April
April 16-20: Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Flame 2012
http://www.informaglobalevents.com/event/flame-conference 
April 17-20: Maastricht, the Netherlands
2nd European Energy Conference
http://energy-conference.eu/ 
April 16-18: Trondheim, Norway
Technoport 2012
http://technoport.no/conference-2012/ 
April 26-27: Copenhagen, Denmark
Annual Euroheat & Power Conference
http://conference2012.eu/ 
May
May 10-12: Florence, Italy
International Conference on the European Energy Market
http://eem12.org/ 
May 14-16 or April 22-25: Berlin, Germany
B4E Business for the Environment – Global Summit 2012
http://www.b4esummit.com/ 
June
June 4-8: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
25th World Gas Conference
http://www.wgc2012.com/ 
June 12-14: Rome, Italy
International Energy Program Evaluation Conference
www.iepec.org/?page_id=975 
June 12-14: Cologne, Germany
Renewable Energy World Europe 2012
http://www.renewableenergyworld-europe.com/index.html 
June 18-22: 
20th European Biomass Conference & Exhibition
http://www.conference-biomass.com/ 
